

Logistics Management Institute

Effective Delivery of Transition
Assistance to Air Force Members
Leaving the Service

AF504R1

Albert H. Schroetel
Charles R. Price
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March 1997

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Logistics Management Institute
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean, Virginia 22102-7805

Effective Delivery of Transition Assistance to Air
Force Members Leaving the Service

AF504R1/MARCH 1997

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Congress established the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for the armed forces in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510). This program assists military members and their families who are leaving the military services, and DoD civilians affected by base closure and restructuring, to make a smooth and rapid transition to the private sector. Transition assistance includes services such as pre-separation counseling, personal financial management counseling, relocation assistance, job search seminars and training. It also includes support from employment assistance centers with trained counselors and computer access to job banks. Program emphasis in the Air Force is on overall transition preparedness for the members and their families, rather than on job placement.

The issue facing the Air Force is—What is the most effective way to deliver transition services? There are strong pressures to reduce the costs and staffing of existing military transition programs. The Air Force asked the Logistics Management Institute to conduct a complete review of the TAP; to develop and assess various alternatives, including outsourcing, for providing transition services; and to recommend the most effective means of service delivery.

PROGRAM STRUCTURE, CUSTOMERS, AND COSTS

The Air Force's TAP is integrated and collocated with other family support programs in family support centers (FSCs) at Air Force bases worldwide. While the bulk of all transition assistance is delivered by the assigned TAP staff, other FSC program managers are responsible for delivering some transition services, especially relocation assistance, financial counseling, and spouse employment. To avoid staffing duplications, the Air Force integrated all these functions into a "one-stop" servicing concept in the FSC. Every FSC staff position, including the TAP staff, contributes a portion of its time to other FSC programs. This team approach to service delivery throughout the FSC creates a synergy that benefits all

programs, including the TAP. The average base TAP realized an annual net gain in FY95 of about one-half of a full-time equivalent (FTE).

Military separations and retirements are the prime generator of TAP “customers.” Of the total customer contacts in FY95, about 95 percent were military members, 4 percent were spouses, and 1 percent were DoD civilians. Air Force transition services were provided to approximately 64,000 Air Force members who separated or retired at 91 bases worldwide in FY95.

We computed the average cost for Air Force TAP services to be \$187 per military separatee.

ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFFING MODELS

The methodology used in this study is an adaptation of the formal benchmarking process. We compared TAP’s structure with the three following “models” of organizational structure and staffing:

- ◆ *Quality of Life (QoL) Model.* The Air Force considers TAP to be an important part of its QoL program. The QoL model was used to examine how services are delivered in QoL programs similar to TAP, such as housing referral, education, and libraries.

The TAP uses the same organizational and staffing approach as virtually all other Air Force QoL programs, that is, “in-house” organizations staffed by Air Force civilians and some military.

Application of the QoL model would result in no changes in TAP, including staffing and organization.

- ◆ *The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM)/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Outsourcing Model.* Stated simply, the CORM/OMB model requires outsourcing all functions that are not “inherently governmental” and for which a commercial source exists.

Because nearly all transition functions are commercial activities and are not subject to exemption from outsourcing under DoD guidance, neither law nor policy preclude outsourcing TAP. However, using the cost data we gathered and findings from related studies on past “A-76” competitions, we conclude that significant savings are unlikely to be realized from contracting out because contract administration costs would further decrease savings.

TAP is *not* a good candidate for outsourcing because it is a small, decentralized program; it employs only 178 FTEs dispersed worldwide at 91 sites.

- ◆ *Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) Model.* ACAP is the only military transition program that follows a different organizational and staffing approach from that used by the Air Force. ACAP has two organizational parts, staffed by Army civilians, and another staffed and operated by a commercial contractor. ACAP also adheres to a different program philosophy than the other services, placing greater emphasis on job search assistance (as compared with the other services' emphases on overall preparation for the transition process).

Following the ACAP model would require the Air Force to adopt a different philosophy about transition services, which would increase costs. Following the same methodology used to compute the Air Force's per capita costs of \$187, we estimated the ACAP costs to be \$275 per separation.

Our analysis of two variations on the basic application of an ACAP model also indicates that both options would increase transition services costs beyond what the Air Force is now spending, even before contract surcharges were added.

ADDITIONAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES

In addition to TAP organization and staffing, we addressed three other program management issues: work force and workload imbalances, performance metrics, and use of technology. Our findings are as follows:

- ◆ Although the overall TAP staff level is lean (two or less positions at 93 percent of the bases), it is not well aligned with associated workloads. This work force imbalance was identified to the Air Force. We designed an algorithm for use in realigning existing positions.
- ◆ All four military services lack adequate program performance metrics. The absence of these metrics limits the ability to measure the effectiveness, cost, consistency, and quality of the services being delivered. Additionally, there is no standard mechanism or criteria in use to determine the usefulness or quality of transition services. We developed and administered a prototype survey of TAP customers in which they were asked to rank the usefulness of 17 TAP services. The prototype demonstrated the usefulness of gathering this performance feedback and illustrated its potential usefulness in program management.

-
- ◆ The Air Force's TAP does not have a good management information system (MIS) to support TAP. Program data available at management headquarters levels do not have the level of detail needed for effective management decision-making. We also identified uneven reporting of existing data. The Army's ACAP MIS is an effective model for TAP MIS design.
 - ◆ Too much manual processing takes place in the TAP. The Air Force has started to investigate the use of technology to enhance TAP's efficiency. "Expert system" technology has the potential to increase the productivity of FSC staffs. Another example of the application of a new technology is the Army's "TAP-in-a-Box" for use at isolated locations where there is no full-time TAP staff. These new technologies offer the potential for productivity enhancements, especially in TAP counseling, at modest costs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Air Force should do the following:

- ◆ Continue using the current method of delivering the TAP by primarily using a government work force.
- ◆ Realign TAP staff to balance it with workload and program requirements.
- ◆ Develop program performance metrics and a standardized means of capturing customer satisfaction and program utility data, such as conducting surveys.
- ◆ Increase the use of automation and technology, such as implementing an expert system, to improve program delivery, management, and evaluation.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

PURPOSE

This report presents the background, methodology, and results of the Logistics Management Institute's (the Institute's) study of the United States Air Force (USAF) Transition Assistance Program (TAP). The report describes the TAP, why it was initiated, and how it operates. We examine the organization, structure, and costs of the Air Force TAP and compare it to other delivery options, including Army, Navy, and Marine Corps transition programs. We also provide our findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an analysis of data collected from 84 Air Force bases, 8 major air commands (MAJCOMs), the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), and Headquarters (HQ) USAF.

This study recommends the most effective way for the Air Force to deliver transition assistance to its military members and civilian employees who are separating or retiring from active service, and to the families of these two groups.

BACKGROUND


Congress established the TAP for the Armed Forces in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510), largely in response to the significant military downsizing then underway. Transition assistance was designed to assist military members, many of whom were being asked to leave active duty, make as smooth and rapid a transition to the private sector as possible. Family members also were made eligible for certain transition benefits and services, including job placement counseling for spouses, extended healthcare, commissary and exchange privileges, and counseling designed to help families readjust to major career changes. Subsequent legislation extended eligibility for transition assistance to civilian employees and their families affected by the restructuring and downsizing.

The goal of TAP is to equip people leaving military service with the skills and knowledge necessary to successfully reenter the civilian work force. To achieve this goal, TAP provides pre-separation counseling, individual transition planning, employment assistance, relocation assistance, financial counseling, and other benefits and services. Program emphasis in the Air Force is on overall transition preparedness rather than job placement.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

The Department of Defense (DoD) experiences a large turnover in military personnel every year. Figure 1-1 shows that military losses in DoD have averaged around 326,000 members annually since 1990. While it is not the objective of this study to justify the continuation of TAP services, the continued large number of annual separations projected, in excess of 240,000 every year through fiscal year (FY) 2000, demonstrates that the need for transition services will continue.¹

*Figure 1-1. Military Separations and Retirements
(by Service and Fiscal Year)*



Source: Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management) and annual service personnel plans.

The Air Force reduced the size of its military force by more than 40 percent in the 10 years following FY87. While the military drawdown will be largely completed by the end of FY96, DoD “continues to pursue a civilian drawdown strategy that calls for cumulative reductions in the civilian work force between FY89 and FY01 of approximately 35 percent.”² The prospect of further civilian reductions on this scale continues to place substantial pressure on the MAJCOMs and bases to reduce their civilian work force.

¹ The term separations, as used in this report, refers to both military separations and military retirements.

² *Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense*, March 1996, p. 88.

To summarize the problem: The Air Force has a legal requirement to provide transition assistance to separating military members and to civilians affected by downsizing or restructuring. There are strong pressures to reduce the costs of existing military transition programs, or perhaps even eliminate them. At the same time, there are indications that civilian transition programs need to be expanded. The problem facing the Air Force is—What is the most effective way to deliver transition services?

The Office of Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel, HQ, USAF, asked LMI to conduct a complete review of the Air Force's TAP to assess various alternatives for providing transition services and to recommend the most effective way for delivering those services.

In the Air Force, TAP is one of 13 family support center (FSC) programs and services. At the end of FY95, the Air Force had approximately 1,100 employees working in 91 FSCs worldwide.³ Since the majority (79 percent) of that work force and all but one of the Air Force transition staff are civilian employees, the pressure to absorb civilian cuts in TAP and other FSC programs will continue to be a significant issue. This problem is intensified by the distribution in staffing of the small TAP work force. Most installations have only two civilians operating the TAP, while a few installations have only one. Consequently, any sizable cuts in this program could adversely impact the ability of the TAP work force to maintain the viability of a program mandated by Congress and considered an important quality of life (QoL) program by DoD and the Air Force.

In his annual report to the President and Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated

Protecting the quality of life of service members is not only the right thing to do, it is critical to preserving military readiness. . . [T]ransition support and services are a vital part of treating members right, even as they leave military service and embark upon new careers. This common sense approach to military separation is essential for the well-being of all military members. . . . The consideration and assistance given to over 300,000 service members and their families who return to civilian life each year remain priorities for the Department.⁴

An April 1996 Air Force white paper entitled *Quality of Life Strategy*, states that Family Support Centers "contribute to base communities and readiness. The FSCs Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is a critical management tool to facilitate separations and retirements in the Air Force."⁵

³ There was a total of 194 TAP positions Air Force-wide at the end of FY95.

⁴ *Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense*, March 1996, pp. 35, 44, and 94.

⁵ Air Force White Paper, *Quality of Life Strategy*, April 1996, p. 8.

Based on the importance placed on transition, relocation, and other family support programs by OSD and the Air Force, the Air Force is committed to supporting and maintaining the viability of these programs. However, as a result of resource competition DoD-wide and the pressures to reduce costs and civilian positions, the Air Force must assess various alternatives, including outsourcing, for providing transition assistance, relocation assistance, and other critical family support programs in the future.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

In its most simple, generic terms, this study's objective can be stated as: *To determine the best means to deliver a service*. After considering the full range of methodological options to support this objective, we determined that two approaches were potentially applicable. These are

- ◆ the development and use of criteria to rank alternatives and
- ◆ the use of a "benchmarking" technique.

A more detailed discussion of both of these methodological options follows.

Common Features of Both Methodologies

In either option, the first three steps are virtually identical. In both options, the first step is to conduct background research, the next step is to describe the functions required to deliver the service, and the third step is data collection:

- ◆ *Background research.* This step includes review of applicable legislation, existing reports, studies, and policy guidance; conduct of site visits; and interviews of program managers, service providers, commanders, and customers.
- ◆ *Describe and diagram functions.* The next step in both options is to describe the discrete functions that are required to deliver the service. The program's services are "decomposed" into their most fundamental tasks and functions to assess what is being done, what resources are being consumed, and what the outputs are. The actual processes may be diagrammed to show interrelationships between functions and players. This step is essential to subsequent analysis regardless of the approach used.
- ◆ *Data collection.* This step begins by reviewing available ("off the shelf") data to determine if it is suitable for the methodological approach contemplated. If it is unsuitable or insufficient, then new data must be collected. This is the last step that is common to these two methodological options.

The following subsections describe the actions that follow these initial steps. These actions are dissimilar and unique to each of the methodologies we considered using in this study.

Alternative One: Use of Criteria to Rank Alternatives

Fundamental to this methodology is the development of criteria to evaluate and rank (prioritize) the services being performed and the functions required to deliver these services. There are several steps involved in this process.

- ◆ *Develop potential criteria.* Candidate lists of criteria can be developed in many ways, for example; interviews with experts, surveys of customers, or the use of focus groups.
- ◆ *Rank and weigh criteria.* After developing potential criteria, it is usually necessary to rank and weigh the candidates prior to actually applying them to the alternatives. This step can also involve the use of expert opinion, customer surveys, and focus groups. Focus group input can be facilitated and enhanced through the use of sophisticated computerized group decisionware.
- ◆ *Develop service delivery alternatives.* Various means of service delivery must be developed and described in quantifiable terms. The salient features of the delivery means must be described and quantified in sufficient detail to permit decision-makers to fully understand and discriminate between various alternatives. It is often useful to disaggregate the alternatives into their discrete functions and categorize them as “core” and “not core.” Core may refer to the functions most closely related to the primary mission of the organization. The term could also refer to the organization’s competency in performing the function (“we do this function better than anyone else”) or may even be defined in law or regulation.
- ◆ *Rank alternatives.* In this final step, the products of the previous steps are brought together. Ranking alternatives can be accomplished in either of two ways: The actual ranking process can be performed by the decision makers themselves, thereby giving them greater insight into and “ownership” of the final decision. Alternatively, expert opinion, customer surveys, and focus groups composed of program managers, customers, or experts can be assembled to develop rank order lists of the alternatives, which are subsequently presented to decision-makers for a final selection.

Alternative Two: Use of a Benchmarking Technique

The second methodology we considered using in this study is “benchmarking.” Benchmarking is defined by the American Productivity and Quality Center as:

... The process of identifying, understanding, and adapting outstanding practices and processes from organizations anywhere in the world to help your organization improve its performance.⁶

In its formal sense, benchmarking is an extensive process. It is not a “one time” event; rather, it is part of a continuous improvement process. It often requires the establishment of a benchmarking partnership, whereby organizations continuously compare and measure philosophies, policies, practices, and procedures to gain information to improve their operations.

The “benchmarking” technique we contemplated for this study was an adaptation of this more formal definition and practice of benchmarking. Because we were examining a relatively limited and structured program, the “benchmarking” methodology we contemplated using would make comparisons using several existing “alternative” models of service delivery.

As discussed earlier, the first three steps of both methodological approaches we considered are virtually identical. The methodologies would diverge beginning after that point. The remaining steps in our adaptation of the benchmarking process would be as follows:

- ◆ *Identify alternative delivery models.* Review various alternative delivery models for the service (transition assistance in this case). The models need not be delivering the same service, but the customer bases and objectives of the service should be relatively analogous. In addition to other actual service delivery “models,” policy and statutory guidance can also represent a “model.”
- ◆ *Develop and apply criteria.* Evaluate each of the alternatives using relevant criteria. Examples of possible criteria are cost, impact on existing organization, and compliance with law or policy.
- ◆ *Select best alternative.* Based upon the application of the criteria, reach conclusions and make recommendations.

⁶ American Productivity and Quality Center, Houston Texas, <http://www.apqc.org>, October 1996.

We did not make a final decision on the methodology to be used until we had completed the first three steps common to both approaches. The insight we gained in the process of accomplishing those steps made it evident that the benchmarking methodology was more appropriate for this study.

ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

The report consists of seven chapters.

Chapter 2 discusses the establishment of transition benefits and services for the armed forces by reviewing legislative requirements, OSD policy guidance, and the shared roles and responsibilities of the Departments of Defense, Labor (DoL), and Veterans Affairs (VA).

Chapter 3 provides a general discussion of the philosophy, organization, and delivery of transition services by each of the military services.

Chapter 4 describes the results of our background research and data-collection efforts. It also provides a detailed description of TAP functions.

Chapter 5 provides the analysis of all the data collected, examines alternative delivery models, and presents findings concerning the most appropriate organizational and staffing model for the Air Force.

Chapter 6 addresses three related issues: the alignment of the TAP work force and workload, the need for program measurement metrics, and the potential for increased use of technology to enhance the TAP.

Chapter 7 presents conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 2

Establishment of Transition Benefits and Services for the Armed Forces

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND REQUIREMENTS

Following its earlier legislation to provide *relocation* assistance to active duty members and their families, and anticipating the impending military drawdown, Congress passed legislation in 1989 authorizing a pilot project to provide *transition* assistance to separating service members. Section 408 of Pub. L. 101-237, the Veterans' Benefits Amendments of 1989, created a partnership between the Departments of Defense (DoD), Labor (DoL), and Veterans' Affairs (VA). The law required them to conduct a pilot program that offered job search assistance and related transition services to members who were within 180 days of separating. The transition assistance was furnished through 3-day workshops conducted jointly at selected military installations by professionally trained facilitators from state employment services, military family support organizations, DoL contractors, and VA benefits counselors.

Primary responsibility for developing and implementing the pilot program was assigned to DoL's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS). The pilot program, modeled after California's successful Career Awareness Program (CAP), was initiated at 12 test sites in six states (California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia); all four services participated. Original program goals were to improve employment rates, reduce service unemployment costs, improve retention, and reduce service training costs. The retention goal was later dropped due to DoD downsizing initiatives.¹

The first TAP workshops began in May and June 1990 and covered six broad topics: (1) assessing military skills and their transfer to the civilian sector, (2) setting employment objectives, (3) preparing resumes and job applications that present military experience in civilian terms, (4) developing interviewing skills, (5) negotiating salary and evaluating offers, and (6) understanding veterans' benefits and support services.²

Two factors affected the next evolutionary phase of TAP—DoD downsizing initiatives and the occurrence of Operation Desert Storm, which ended February 28, 1991. "The combination of these two events resulted in a rapid and early expan-

¹ DoL Report, *Transition Assistance Program: Initial Impact Evaluation*, November 1993.

² See Note 1, this chapter.

sion of the pilot TAP that was not originally anticipated, but was necessary to serve the [high] volume of service members exiting the Armed Forces.”³ Within a year after the pilot TAP was initiated, Congress recognized the need for an expanded TAP to help the many separating veterans make suitable career choices and adjust to civilian life.

Congress enacted Section 502 of Pub. L. 101-510 (National Defense Authorization Act for FY91), November 5, 1990 requiring a TAP to be established and maintained on a full-scale basis by each of the armed forces. Many of the same features found in the earlier TAP pilot project, such as the partnership and joint transition responsibilities between DoD, DoL, and VA, were continued in the new legislation. Some new requirements were also included, such as mandatory pre-separation counseling and voluntary participation by spouses. There was also a shift in the purpose of the TAP, since retention was no longer a priority issue. “Instead, increased emphasis was placed on helping military personnel make informed decisions, integrate more swiftly into the civilian work force, and achieve a better match between their military training and their civilian employment.”⁴ Table 2-1 provides a list of the services and benefits established by Pub. L. 101-510 and subsequent transition legislation.

As Table 2-1 shows, transition assistance is composed of two distinct components—transition *services* and transition *benefits*. While these two components complement each other, there is an important difference between them. Transition benefits were designed to encourage some members to leave active duty earlier than planned and to assist them in the process of separating. Most of these benefits were intended solely for the military drawdown. Unless amended, the legislative authority establishing them expires on 30 September 1999.⁵

Some of the transition benefits, such as the extended use of commissaries, exchanges, and military housing, were intended to provide temporary assistance to help families overcome short-notice and unexpected career changes. Other benefits, like the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA), and Special Separation Benefit (SSB), may be viewed as tools to shape and size the active duty force. These transition benefits should not be confused with transition services, which provide separating members with pre-separation counseling, employment, relocation, and financial planning assistance. Transition services were permanently authorized without specific ending dates in the legislation establishing them.

³ DoL Report, *Transition Assistance Program: Early Program Experience*, November 20, 1992, p. 1-2. The DoD drawdown peaked in 1992 at about 390,000 losses as shown in Figure 1-1.

⁴ House Conference Report 101-923, National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1991, October 23, 1990, p. 604.

⁵ DoD Report to Congress, *DoD Transition and Relocation Assistance Programs: Pursuant to FY96 Defense Appropriations Conference Report (104-334)*, undated (submitted March 1996), p. 3.

Table 2-1. TAP Services and Benefits

Transition services	Transition benefits ^a
Pre-separation counseling within 180 days of separation	Transitional healthcare benefits and conversion health policies
Employment skills verification	Extended use of commissaries/exchanges
Permanent employment assistance centers	Extended use of military housing
Transition assistance seminars	Excess leave and permissive temporary duty to facilitate relocation
Employment assistance	Priority affiliation with the National Guard and Reserve
Relocation assistance	Nonappropriated Fund hiring preferences
Public and community service	"Troops to Teachers" and "Troops to Cops" programs
Automated transition assistance—defense outplacement referral system and transition bulletin board	Extended use of DoD Dependent Schools System for seniors
	VSI, SSB, and TERA

^a Under Pub. L. 101-510, the first five listed benefits applied only to involuntarily separated service members. The FY92 and FY93 National Defense Authorization Acts expanded these authorities to include individuals separating under the VSI and SSB programs.

A more extensive discussion of TAP services and benefits and related legal requirements can be found in the Defense Conversion Commission's 1992 Report to Congress.⁶

SHARED ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TAP

House and Senate conferees who worked on the new transition legislation made their intentions clear regarding how they wanted the TAP implemented.

The conferees expect the Departments of Labor, Defense and Veterans Affairs to *jointly* develop and execute within 60 days of enactment an agreement that clearly details the responsibilities and activities of the three departments in establishing the program, to include provisions for the selection of appropriate sites, the development of a suitable curriculum, the dissemination of information, and the evaluation of the quality of the program. Cooperation among the three departments is essential for the creation of an effective program which will successfully meet the diverse needs of the servicemembers and their spouses.⁷

⁶ Annex J (*Military Personnel: End Strength, Separations, Transition Programs and Downsizing Strategy*) to the Defense Conversion Commission Report, *Adjusting to the Drawdown*, 31 December 1992.

⁷ See Note 4, this chapter.

Section 502 of Pub. L. 101-510, which is codified in a new Chapter 58, Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), required the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, and Veterans Affairs to enter into a detailed agreement within 60 days after the legislation was enacted to carry out their joint responsibilities in providing a TAP workshop for military members and their spouses. The first such agreement was a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the appropriate secretary in each department on January 2, 1991.⁸

The MOU spells out detailed responsibilities for each of the three departments and their joint responsibilities at the national, state, and local levels. Program delivery leadership is concentrated within DoL, while DoD is responsible for service members participation and logistical support. VA is responsible for providing veterans benefits information and for program delivery of the Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP).

The MOU commits DoD, DoL, and VA to establish and deliver a TAP workshop for members of the armed forces who are within 180 days of separation from active duty and their spouses, as required by Chapter 58, 10 U.S.C. 1144. Former service members may attend the TAP workshops on a space-available basis. The three departments agreed that 3-day TAP workshops would be conducted on or within 100 miles of all major military installations in the United States.⁹ DoL agreed to provide sufficient instructors to permit workshop sizes between 15 to 50 participants. For separating members assigned overseas, DoD is responsible for providing a DoD version of the TAP workshop.

POLICY GUIDANCE

In addition to the joint DoD, DoL, and VA MOU, each of the military services and OSD issued policy guidance relating to the TAP. According to the DoD TAP policy directive, it is DoD policy that

1. Transition assistance programs prepare separating Service members and their families with the skills, tools, and self-confidence necessary to ensure successful reentry into the Nation's civilian work force.
2. Transition assistance programs be designed to complete the military personnel "life cycle." This cycle begins with the Service member's recruitment from the civilian sector, continues with training and sustainment throughout a Service member's active service in the Armed Forces, and ends when the Service member returns to the civilian sector.¹⁰

⁸ The original MOU was superseded by a new MOU, December 28, 1994 (Appendix A).

⁹ A major installation is defined in the MOU as a base or post under the jurisdiction of DoD with 500 or more active duty service members assigned.

¹⁰ DoD Directive (DoDD) 1332.35, *Transition Assistance For Military Personnel*, December 9, 1993, p. 2.

The DoD directive also indicates that TAP should include two components, corresponding generally to those listed in Table 2-1:

- ◆ *transition services*, such as pre-separation counseling and employment assistance,
- ◆ *separation entitlements (or benefits)*, such as SSB and VSI.

In order to minimize personal inconvenience and expense, DoD policy provides that "Service members from one Service shall not be restricted from participating in another Service's transition assistance programs unless workload or other unusual circumstances dictate."¹¹ The policy also encourages maximum participation of spouses in transition planning and counseling and gives priority for transition assistance to eligible personnel who recently returned from overseas.

One indication of the importance DoD attaches to the TAP is reflected in a recent DoD Report to Congress, which stated:

The Department views both the TAP and the RAP [Relocation Assistance Program] programs as important to the Quality of Life (QoL) of our Service members and their families and thus vital to the work and living environment of military service personnel, and preserving medium term readiness.¹²

Air Force policy guidance, as well as procedures and standards for the Air Force TAP, are contained in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-3022, which stresses the following program goal.

The program goal is to equip separating and retiring military personnel and their families, and civilians and their spouses adversely impacted by the restructuring and reduction of DoD, with skills and knowledge for reentry into the civilian work force. **The emphasis is on transition preparation rather than job placement.** Basic program components include preseparation counseling, [DOL] TAP workshops, automated data processing and resource centers, base and community publicity and networking, and program evaluation and reporting. Transition staffs should develop mutually beneficial partnerships with other programs to prevent duplication of effort and promote efficient, effective use of resources to meet the needs of their customers.¹³ [emphasis added]

The Air Force has structured their transition program so that it is fully integrated and collocated with other base-level FSC functions, such as the RAP, Personal Financial Management Program, and Career Focus (spouse employment) Program.

¹¹ See Note 10, this chapter.

¹² See Note 5, this chapter.

¹³ AFI 36-3022, *Transition Assistance Program*, February 1, 1996, p. 1.

No Army regulations, *per se*, pertain to the TAP, however; Army policy guidance for the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) is contained in U.S. Total Army Personnel Command/Commanding General (PERSCOM/CG) Memorandum, *ACAP Full Implementation Guidance*, June 22, 1993. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps policy guidance relating to those Services' Transition Assistance Management Programs (TAMP) is contained in Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1900.2, August 30, 1993 for the Navy and Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1754.5, *TAMP Standard Operating Procedures*, March 17, 1995 for the Marine Corps.

Chapter 3

Service Departments Transition Assistance Programs


AIR FORCE TRANSITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Air Force TAP is available to all separating and retiring active duty military personnel and their families. It is also available to civilians adversely affected by the DoD restructuring and drawdown. Overall responsibility for TAP rests with the Air Force Family Matters Office, a part of Headquarters, USAF Human Resources Development Division (AF/DPCH). In addition to serving as manager for all family matters programs, AF/DPCH is responsible for developing transition program policy and providing budget and manpower oversight. It does so through an organizational chain that includes the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) transition operations center and transition managers at each of eight MAJCOMs, two direct reporting units (DRUs), and a total of 91 TAP sites (at the end of FY95).

Organizational Structure

Figure 3-1 depicts this organizational chain.

Figure 3-1. Air Force TAP Organizational Structure



Functional Summary

The AFPC transition operations center serves as the primary interface between transition and personnel functions; develops and implements procedural guidance through the MAJCOMs and base-level transition and personnel offices; oversees and administers the Defense Department Form 2586, *Verification of Military Experience and Training* (VMET); provides personnel data support to base-level FSC transition offices; collects and consolidates MAJCOM data to meet Air Force and DoD reporting requirements; and delivers formal operations training to transition assistance managers (TAM) and transition assistance specialists (TAS).

The MAJCOM transition staffs, which are aligned functionally under the MAJCOM director of personnel, disseminate policy and procedural guidance to their bases; provide equipment oversight, budget execution, and accountability; and collect and consolidate base-level data to meet Air Force and DoD reporting requirements.

At base level, the transition program is integrated into and collocated with the base FSC. As shown in Table 3-1, the TAP is one of 13 FSC programs and services, all supervised by the FSC director, who reports to the Mission Support Squadron Commander. Other programs and services may be provided as needed. Base commanders are required to ensure that each active duty installation with a military population of at least 500 establishes and maintains an FSC.

Table 3-1. Family Support Center Programs and Services

Programs	Services
♦ Transition Assistance Program	♦ Information, Referral, and Follow-up
♦ Relocation Assistance Program	♦ Policy, Planning, and Coordination
♦ Career Focus Program	♦ Leadership Consultation
♦ Personal Financial Management Program	♦ Readiness
♦ Air Force Aid Society	♦ Crisis Assistance
♦ Volunteer Resource Program	♦ Outreach
♦ Family Life Education	

Note: A description of these programs and services can be found in AFI 36-3009, *Family Support Center Program*, 12 April 1994, p. 2.

The FSC staff functions as a cohesive team to provide direct customer support by conducting transition programs for base populations ranging from 650 to about 10,000 people. Transition programs interface closely with other FSC programs and other base support agencies such as military and civilian personnel, off-duty education, and the library.

TAP Work Force

At the end of FY95, the Air Force-wide TAP work force, measured on a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis, was comprised of 194 employees, distributed organizationally as shown in Table 3-2.¹

Table 3-2. The TAP Work Force—FY95

Function	Level	Full-time equivalents	Grades
Policy	HQ, USAF	1	Lt Col
Operations	HQ, AFPC	3	GS-5, -9, -12
Program oversight	MAJCOMS	12	GS-7, -9, -11, -12, -13
Program execution	Base/FSC	178	GS-7, -9, -11
Total work force	—	194	—

Geographically, the TAP work force operated at 70 sites in the continental United States (CONUS) and 21 overseas locations at the end of FY95.² Most of these TAP sites (84 percent) served base populations of 6,000 military members or less.

TAP Customers

We collected extensive amounts of new data for FY95 from 84 FSCs worldwide (93 percent of all TAP sites). This effort will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, but it is appropriate at this time to provide a summary from that data of the customer base for the Air Force's transition program. Table 3-3 shows that military members comprised about 95 percent of the FY95 customer base, while spouses and civilians made up 4 percent and 1 percent, respectively. Although military members can use the transition services of any military department, the table shows that 96 percent of Air Force TAP customers were Air Force military members, their dependents, or Air Force civilians.

Air Force separations and retirements are shown because these events are the primary generators of TAP clients. When comparing the number of separations (60,310) to the number of TAP customer contacts, it is evident that TAP assistance is not a "one visit" process. On average, military customers make six visits to the TAP offices.

¹ One FTE is equal to 2,080 staff hours. For nontechnical accounting, an FTE can be thought of as one staff year.

² Three of these TAP sites (Pentagon, Keflavik, and Fort Meade) were considered "stand-alone" sites because they are at locations that do not have an FSC.

Table 3-3. Air Force TAP Customers—FY95

Category	Military	Civilians	Spouses
Transition customer contacts (Air Force)	373,022 (95%)	5,396 (1 %)	13,637 (4%)
Transition Customer Contacts (other services)	12,800	445	1,167
Air Force separations and retirements	60,310 ^a	9,753	NA

^a This is the unaudited number of separations and retirements reported by 84 bases for FY95. The audited number of Air Force-wide losses in FY95 is 63,750.

The Air Force Philosophy

Much of what the Air Force does in its “people programs” is derived from a set of fundamental principles or beliefs about the relationship that exists between the Air Force institution and its people. Almost from its beginning, the Air Force has fostered a reputation for “taking care of its own.” This attitude is reflected in the FY96 annual report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the President and the Congress:

Assuring our people an equitable quality of life has been the continuous priority of our leadership. As a force that relies heavily on its technological advantage, we depend on retaining highly experienced, motivated, well-trained people. We recognize the correlation between readiness and care for our families. We succeed in our mission by putting people first. To assure a balanced approach toward people first programs, we developed the Air Force Quality of Life Strategy. This strategy focuses our efforts on improving the quality of life for our members and their families.³

The following discussion about FSCs, transition assistance, and other FSC programs is among the “people first” QoL priorities described in the April 1996 Air Force White Paper, *Quality of Life Strategy*:

We must maintain strong Family Support Centers and strengthen Transition Assistance, Relocation Assistance, Career Focus, and Personal Financial Management programs. Family Support Centers (FSCs) contribute to base communities and readiness. In a Spring 1995 survey, Air Force commanders and first sergeants summarily stated, “I couldn’t do my job without them!” [emphasis in original]

³ *Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense, Part VI, Report of the Secretary of the Air Force*, March 1996, p. 271.

The FSCs Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is a critical management tool to facilitate separations and retirements in the Air Force. We will continue the drawdown over the FYDP [Future Year Defense Plan], losing approximately 14,000 military and 20,000 civilians. While especially useful for our active duty force during the past years, the need for these continuing services is increasingly critical for our civilian drawdown. We will also lose, through normal attrition (separations/retirements), over 40,000 annually.

The transitioning people and their future employers will benefit from the assistance provided through this program and, as a result, unemployment compensation costs will be controlled. Studies indicate that since 1992 a cost avoidance of \$152 M in unemployment compensation costs per year for 200,000 separates has been realized DoD-wide. Sustained funding will allow us to institutionalize this important program.⁴

This “people first” philosophy guided the Air Force’s decision in 1991 to organize, staff, and operate the transition program with the objective of providing maximum benefit and convenience for separating members and their families.

ARMY CAREER AND ALUMNI PROGRAM

The Army’s TAP was initiated in the mid- to late-1980s, before the current military drawdown began.⁵ As conceived by the Army staff, the idea was to establish employment assistance centers to help separating soldiers transition to a new career. The concept approved by Army leadership included a multimillion dollar contract for a transition program that would be operated by a commercial firm but be fully integrated into the Army personnel life cycle. In addition to assisting soldiers who were leaving active duty, it was envisioned that it would be an important recruiting and retention tool. It was also viewed as an expression of the Army’s intent to “take care of its own.” According to a spokesperson from the U.S. Total Army PERSCOM, the rationale underlying the Army’s thinking at the time was as follows:⁶

- ◆ The Army tends not to be a career choice for large numbers of soldiers, resulting in a greater proportion of non retirement eligible members on active duty than in the case of the Air Force. This means the Army needs a larger “throughput” of people to sustain the force. For example, the Army considers an annual attrition of 70,000 members to be “steady state” based

⁴ See Note 5, Chapter 1.

⁵ During the Vietnam era drawdown, there was a DoD program called Project Transition that focused primarily on skills training. It had a limited number of participants and was terminated in the mid-1970s.

⁶ Interview with Ms. Pauline Bothello, Chief, Total Army Transition Division, PERSCOM, 28 August 1995.

on an assumed end strength of 495,000 soldiers. The recruiting demands driven by these kind of force dynamics are obviously high.

- ◆ Another reality is that over half of the Army's forces are composed of Guard and Reserve units, which necessitates strong "in-service" recruiting of active duty separatees into the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG).
- ◆ Army commanders needed a program to take care of those soldiers who were making a career choice to not re-enlist.

The ACAP was conceived as a program that could be integrated into the Army personnel life cycle to deal with the force management issues. However, before an ACAP contract was awarded, funding for the program was eliminated in a cost-cutting decision. The ACAP concept remained temporarily dormant, with only a small locally staffed experimental program at Fort Bragg, NC and a single action officer on the PERSCOM staff.⁷

By spring 1990, the Army realized it was facing a large-scale downsizing brought on by the end of the Cold War. The ACAP proposal was resurrected at that time and approved by the Secretary of the Army to manage the downsizing, to provide a simultaneous means of supporting Army recruiting and retention needs, and to minimize the negative effects of force reduction on soldiers and their families. Initially, it was organized as a pilot program in the fall of 1990 with two components: a transition assistance office (TAO), operated by government employees, and a contractor-operated job assistance center (JAC).⁸

After operating for about a year as a pilot program at eight JAC sites, and following enactment of the transition provisions in Pub. L. 101-510, ACAP became a full fledged Army-wide program. A contract was competitively awarded to Resource Consultants, Inc. (RCI) to establish 47 additional JACs throughout the world over a 3-month period.⁹ A corresponding number of TAOs were established at the same time to provide contract oversight and program management.

ACAP Organizational Structure

The ACAP manager on each post, called the transition services manager (TSM), is a Department of the Army civilian who works for the post director of personnel and community activities. Unlike the Air Force TAP, ACAP is not integrated into or collocated with the Army community services (ACS) function, the equivalent of the Air Force FSC. The TSM "... directly supervises the activities of the TAO,


⁷ Susan Harvey, "Managing Downsizing in the Military," *Program Manager*, November-December 1994, p. 48.

⁸ Susan Harvey, "Army Centralizes Outplacement," *Personnel Journal*, May 1994.

⁹ See Note 7, this chapter.

coordinates all on-post transition-related services, and works closely with the contractor's local JAC manager."¹⁰ The TAO and JAC are usually collocated in the same facility. The ACAP organizational structure is depicted in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Army ACAP Organizational Structure



ACAP Mission and Functions

The mission of the ACAP "is to provide comprehensive personnel transition assistance and processing through field operations worldwide and to centrally plan, develop and manage the Army's job assistance program."¹¹ It is accomplished through the TAO and JAC as they perform the functions outlined in Table 3-4.

The government-staffed TAO initiates the transition process with the *Pre-Separation Counseling Checklist* (DD Form 2648). The TAO staff counsels departing members about available government benefits and services and refers them to other service providers as appropriate. The primary focus of the TAO is "inside the gate," that is, on-post interface with unit commanders and First Sergeants, military and civilian personnel offices, and other service providers. The contract-staffed JAC provides all employment assistance counseling and helps prepare veterans to re-enter the civilian labor market. The JAC also provides the "outside the gate" focus, interfacing with private-sector employees to provide the

¹⁰ See Note 7, this chapter.

¹¹ ACAP mission statement from ACAP Internet Homepage at <http://143.134.109.249/ACAP>, 27 September 1996.

transitioning soldier and Army civilian the latest information on the private-sector job market.

Table 3-4. TAO and JAC Functions

TAO functions (Department of Army civilians)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Register clients ◆ Identify client needs ◆ Provide ACAP orientation ◆ Prepare individual transition plan ◆ Refer client to service providers ◆ Provide remote site support and services ◆ Provide logistics/coordination within installation, community, or program ◆ Assist client throughout transition process ◆ Represent commander's interests
JAC functions (contract operation)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Register clients ◆ Provide JAC orientation ◆ Assess client employment needs and time remaining ◆ Provide seminar/workshop ◆ Provide individual counseling sessions ◆ Review and evaluate client work and progress ◆ Provide orientation on, and schedule use of, client workstation ◆ Assist clients with resumes, cover letters, employment research, etc. ◆ Provide remote site support and services ◆ Update and maintain Army Employer and Alumni Network data ◆ Update and maintain the Army job "Army Hot Leads" data ◆ Prepare management reports ◆ Publicize and promote program

ACAP Process

ACAP has been described as "a comprehensive program that orchestrates a broad range of transition services for soldiers, family members, and eligible...civilians who are preparing to leave the Army."¹² These services include career counseling and guidance, benefits counseling, job search assistance and training, and access to employer and job information databases. One employer database is called the Army Employer and Alumni Network (AEAN), a computerized database "of more than 14,000 employers who are committed to receiving resumes from Army

¹² See Note 7, this chapter.

veterans.”¹³ Another database is called “Army Hot Leads,” which is a job bank of actual positions in the public and private sector developed by the Army and RCI to support departing veterans and their families. These “Hot Leads” are subsequently provided to a DoD job bank called the transition bulletin board (TBB). The TBB is an on-line database maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center and provided to all services for availability to all service members and DoD civilians worldwide.

The first point of contact for those leaving the military is the TAO, usually about 180 days before their scheduled departure. At the first counseling session, an individual transition plan is developed that schedules each individual for legal and financial counseling, educational benefits and testing assistance, and reserve recruiting consultation. The career part of ACAP includes counseling to ensure eligible soldiers are given the opportunity to re-enlist.

The contractor-operated JAC portion of ACAP is run by RCI counselors and staff. Each JAC provides a full range of outplacement counseling services similar to those found in private industry. Their role has been described as follows:

Experienced counselors with master’s degrees operate the JAC and provide training and one-on-one counseling to assist individuals in developing job-search strategies. The goal is to maximize the skills acquired in the military and use them to launch a second career.¹⁴

The Army has served over 500,000 clients since the program began in 1991. In FY95, they operated 55 offices, including 54 JACs, in 26 states and 5 foreign nations.¹⁵

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The Navy and Marine Corps transition programs, called TAMPs, are very similar to each other. They are also more similar in mission and structure to the Air Force’s TAP than to the Army ACAP. The Navy and Marine Corps have small TAMP staffs at their respective service headquarters under the respective service personnel director. Their mission is to develop and disseminate program guidance for units ashore and ships afloat. The TAMP work force in both services is composed largely of civilians, with some military and contractor personnel assigned.

¹³ Susan Harvey, “How Effective Are Large-Scale Outplacement Programs?,” *Human Resource Professional*, July/August 1995.

¹⁴ See Note 7, this chapter.

¹⁵ See Note 7, this chapter.

Navy TAMP

In FY95, the Navy had 76 TAMP sites; 59 in CONUS, 7 in the Pacific theater, 9 in the European theater, and 1 in the Middle East. Most of these TAMP programs were operated within a Navy Family Services Center (NFSC) structure.¹⁶

Two of the CONUS TAMP sites (Norfolk and San Diego) are defined as “fleet-intensive” locations, with populations exceeding 70,000 sailors, while 12 other sites have populations of 500 or less. As shown in Figure 1-1, Chapter 1, the annual number of Navy separations is consistently above those in the Air Force.

A key difference between Navy and Air Force transition programs is that at any given time, the Navy has about 50 percent of its forces deployed at sea, substantially complicating the task of providing transition services. To overcome this difficulty, the Navy uses the Army’s RCI contract to provide Mobile Job Assistance Teams (MJATs) onboard ships returning to port and at remote shore sites to augment TAMP. The Navy reported the MJAT concept was working very successfully.¹⁷

Attendance at 3-day TAP workshops is *mandated* for all separating sailors by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) policy (attendance is optional in the other services). The Navy uses command career counselors to initiate the TAMP process, whereas the process is initiated by the military personnel function in the Army and Air Force. Navy career information teams (CARITs), who provide counseling regarding affiliation with the Navy Reserve, are also involved in the TAMP process. The CARITs also provide CNO-directed briefings and counseling on VA benefits, the DD Form 214, educational opportunities, and check-out procedures. In FY95, there were two CARITs composed of 10 to 15 counselors traveling within the Atlantic and Pacific regions.¹⁸

In addition to the standard organizational structure just described, the Navy has a regional contract in the Hampton Roads, Virginia area that covers five NFSCs—Norfolk, Oceana, Little Creek, Virginia Beach, and Dam Neck. The \$5.5 million regional contract with Zeiders Enterprises, Incorporated, is a firm-fixed-price contract that provides all NFSC staffing (including TAMP positions) at each location, except for two positions—NFSC’s director and deputy director, who are government employees.¹⁹

¹⁶ Interview with Antigone Doucette, Navy TAMP program manager, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 18 September 1995.

¹⁷ See Note 16, this chapter.

¹⁸ See Note 16, this chapter.

¹⁹ Interview with Mr. Zeiders, President, Zeiders Enterprises, Incorporated, and Ms. Hand, 23 May 1996.

USMC TAMP

The USMC's TAMP is organized much like the Navy's with a small staff at Headquarters, USMC and intermediate-level staffs. At these levels, and at the installation level, the staff is almost entirely composed of government civilians.

The primary goals of the Marine Corps' TAMP are to

- ◆ convey mandated transition information and assistance to all separating Marines and their families;
- ◆ ensure Marines are aware of, and have access to, all education, training, employment, and other transition services;
- ◆ support unit readiness by preventing/removing stress, enabling Marines to concentrate on the mission;
- ◆ support retention of Marines avoiding the adverse impact on future recruiting; and
- ◆ minimize unemployment cost to the Nation and Marine Corps.²⁰

To implement these goals, the Marine Corps had 19 sites in FY95, referred to as Career Resource Management Centers, operating within USMC FSCs. The USMC's TAMP philosophy is to empower Marines and other service members and their families to take control of their own transition.

INTER-SERVICE COMPARISONS

In summary, it can be said that the transition programs of all four of the services provide all the transition support required by law. Three of the services (USAF, Navy, and USMC) accomplish this largely through the use of internal DoD civilian staffs. These three services place strong emphasis on preparing the service members and their families for the transition process through the efforts of their transition programs in concert with their FSCs. The Army's philosophical approach places greater emphasis on the actual job search aspects of transition.

Table 3-5 outlines the major characteristics of the services' transition programs.

²⁰ Interview with Ms. Pherby Higgins, USMC TAMP program manager, Headquarters, USMC, 12 December 1995.

Table 3-5. Characteristics of Service Transition Programs—FY95

Item	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF
FY95 budget	\$12.5 + \$16.7	\$13.0	\$4.9	\$11.9
Total locations	55	76	18	91
Overseas locations	12	18	2	21
Authorized staff	327	268	56	184
FY95 separations (000)	106,191	90,437	35,529	63,750
Contracting	approx. one-half ^a	limited ^b	minimal ^c	minimal ^d

^a Roughly one-half of program (JAC), representing over 55 percent of total program costs.

^b A regional contract for five FSCs in Hampton Roads, plus mobile JATs onboard ships returning to port.

^c Varies from site to site, but very small scale and piecemeal.

^d In FY95, 17 bases contracted some transition services, representing about one percent of total program costs.

The Navy and Marine Corps TAMPs are very similar to the Air Forces's TAP in terms of organizational and philosophical approach and staffing. Therefore, we focus more on the Army's ACAP in the remainder of this report because it represents the most dissimilar approach to the delivery of transition services. Specific comparisons of the Air Force program with the Army ACAP are made in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4

Background Research, Description of Transition Functions, and Data Collection

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the first three steps of the study: background research, description of the functions required to deliver transition services, and data collection.

The information presented here is the result of extensive reviews of TAP directives and over 100 interviews with program managers at all levels. Much of this information was gathered during staff visits to two MAJCOMs and 30 base-level FSC and TAP offices. A complete listing of these staff visits is found at Appendix B.

RESULTS OF BACKGROUND RESEARCH

We focus next on defining in greater detail the services provided and who provides them at the federal department and military service levels. Table 4-1 describes each of the required TAP services and identifies the service providers at the federal government and Air Force levels.

Air Force TAP Service Delivery—A Team Approach

Table 4-1 illustrates a very important aspect of transition delivery in the Air Force, the integration of service delivery by several installation-level functions, especially within the FSC. Some required transition services, such as relocation assistance, spouse employment, and financial counseling are not delivered solely by the TAP staff, but instead by the FSC staff members who manage the RAP, Career Focus, and Personal Financial Management Programs (PFMPs) for all military personnel—not just those who are separating.

By virtue of their collocation and integration as a cohesive team in the FSC, all of these service providers function efficiently with a substantial degree of synergism. Although transition assistance managers are still responsible for ensuring all required transition services are provided, duplication of functions and staffing is minimized because the Air Force integrated all these functions into a “one-stop

Table 4-1. Required Transition Services and Service Providers

Required TAP services	Federal provider	USAF FSC provider
Pre-separation counseling —individual counseling provided to members not later than 90 days before separation covering matters such as educational assistance benefits, VA benefits, affiliating with the National Guard and Reserve, and job search/placement assistance	Military services	TAP staff
Individual transition planning —a transition plan for the member and spouse, if applicable, outlining educational, training, and employment objectives	Military services	TAP staff
Financial planning assistance —a financial plan to assist the member in budgeting, saving, investing, and otherwise meeting financial obligations, even during short periods of unemployment	Military services	PFMP staff
Relocation assistance —information about the geographic area where the member will relocate including employment opportunities, labor market, cost of living, housing, child care, and medical care	Military services	Relocation staff
Information on changing careers —counseling about the effect of career change on the member and the family	Military services	TAP staff
Job placement counseling for spouses —counseling and assistance to help spouses find public- or private-sector employment	Military services	Career focus staff
Employment assistance —permanent employment centers established at installations with 500 or more assigned population, offering a range of employment services including the following:	Military services	TAP/other FSC staff
♦ <i>Employment skills verification</i> —certification of member's military job skills, experience, training, and education	DoD/ services	TAP staff
♦ <i>TAP seminars</i> —joint (DoD/DoL/VA) group seminars that provide information about topics such as employment and training assistance; the labor market; resume preparation; job analysis, job search, and job interview techniques—usually lasting 3 days	DoD/DoL/ VA/services	TAP/other FSC staff
♦ <i>Job fairs</i> —DoD, DoL, and VA work jointly with appropriate organizations in promoting and publicizing job fairs	DoD/DoL/ VA/services	TAP/other FSC staff
♦ <i>Resource centers</i> —includes video/print library for employment and relocation assistance; desktop computers offer electronic databases, such as Standard Installation Topic Exchange Service; and job search tools such as Defense Outplacement Referral Service, Public and Community Service, and TBB.	DoD/ services	TAP/other FSC staff

servicing concept” in the FSC. There is a cooperative staff effort among the various FSC functions, such that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. While the TAP staff contributes some of its time to other FSC functions, those other FSC functions contribute considerably more time to the TAP. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the net result of this team effort is that TAP gains almost one-half an FTE staff year of effort annually in meeting its goals.

Description of TAP Functions

The next step in our study is to determine what specific functions, tasks, and activities are performed by the FSC and TAP staff in delivering the transition services discussed earlier. This step also sets the stage for the following step, where the resources expended in the delivery of transition services can be related to specific FSC and TAP staff functions.

Air Force transition policy guidance in AFI 36-3022 outlines broad transition program responsibilities for each organizational level (base, MAJCOM, and Headquarters, USAF) and identifies who is responsible.¹ However, this guidance does not describe what specific functions are performed to carry out these responsibilities. On the basis of our research and interviews, a list of standard program functions, derived from the list of responsibilities in AFI 36-3022, was developed. This effort was facilitated by earlier work done by the Air Combat Command (ACC). It had organized a USAF-wide working group that developed and published a list of standard TAP functions in a quality transition assistance program (QTAP) report in June 1994.² On the basis of our review of the QTAP report and discussions with several transition assistance managers, we decided to adopt (with a few modifications) the list of standard TAP functions developed by the QTAP working group. The functions are as follows:

- ◆ Establish goals, objectives, and procedures.
- ◆ Maintain a resource center and help customers use it.
- ◆ Review and analyze labor market trends.
- ◆ Plan and conduct job/career fairs.
- ◆ Conduct and document pre-separation counseling.
- ◆ Develop and coordinate an annual transition budget.
- ◆ Manage and administer personnel resources.
- ◆ Evaluate program effectiveness and submit required TAP reports.
- ◆ Market the transition program.

¹ See Note 13, Chapter 2.

² United States Air Force Report, *Quality Transition Assistance Program (QTAP)*, 1 June 1994.

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- ◆ Coordinate, plan, and facilitate the TAP seminars.
 - ◆ Establish and maintain the Transition Assistance Coordinating Committee (TACC).

On the basis of our background research, including site visits and interviews with service providers, we determined that the transition staff at each FSC must perform all of these TAP functions to one degree or another, in order to comply with transition policy and statutory requirements. This view is supported by two considerations. First, it is clear that most, if not all, of these functions are linked to specific program responsibilities or requirements listed in AFI 36-3022.³ Second, the QTAP working group, composed of experienced service providers, viewed all of these functions as essential activities in the delivery of Air Force transition services.⁴ Our independent research confirmed that while there may be slight variations in terminology or even execution from one TAP site to the next, those functions listed above define what is required of the TAP staff.

Diagramming of TAP Functions

In the legislation authorizing the TAP, Congress created a complex arrangement for the delivery of transition services involving not only DoD, but DoL, the VA, and other state, regional, and local government agencies as well. Visualizing this organizational structure is further complicated by the fact that TAP services in the Air Force are interrelated with several other FSC programs, such as relocation assistance, financial counseling, and spouse employment. TAP is also linked to other base agencies such as the education office, library, military and civilian personnel flights, medical facility, housing, and transportation.

As our research progressed, a picture of a highly interrelated organizational structure and service delivery mode became increasingly evident. A detailed diagram, or schematic, of these organizational relationships was needed to assess exactly what that process looked like and how the various players interacted. To prepare this schematic, we used flowcharting software to enable a clear depiction of the relationships created by law, DoD policy, and Air Force policy and practice. The detailed diagram at Appendix C shows how the 11 TAP functions at the base level are linked to the specific services provided and to the agencies that participate in the delivery of the service. Looking at this diagram, the interrelationships between services and providers can be traced graphically.

³ See Note 13, Chapter 2.

⁴ See Note 2, this chapter.

COLLECTION OF TAP DATA

This phase of our research focuses on the data needed to support the study and discusses how it was collected. In order to evaluate and compare the current service delivery to alternative models, we needed the capability to identify and isolate costs, labor and nonlabor, and program data. An in-depth discussion about the collection and processing of TAP data is contained in Appendix D.

Review of Existing Data

Intensive reviews of existing data, coupled with site visits, revealed inconsistencies in data capture from installation to installation. For example, “customer” counts at some installations reflected the number of *individuals* that used TAP services during the quarter, no matter how many visits they had made to the TAP offices. At other installations, customers reflected the number of *customer visits*, including repeat visits by the same customers.

Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of existing data was that they did not contain the detailed identification of resource expenditures we needed for this study. Data that documents how much it costs—in terms of labor and nonlabor expenditures—to perform specific transition functions and to provide various services, would be essential to conducting cost comparisons among bases, MAJCOMS, and CONUS locations versus overseas sites.

For these reasons, it became apparent that we would need to design spreadsheets to collect the necessary data and construct a new database for use in this study.

Design and Use of Electronic Spreadsheets

LMI designed and used four electronic spreadsheets to facilitate an extensive data-collection effort. Examples of these spreadsheets and detailed descriptions of their data elements can be found in Appendix D. The capability to transmit the spreadsheets electronically facilitated faster data transmission to and from the sites, better data management and computation capability, and, as a result, quicker analysis of the data. Data were collected for FY95, since that period reflected the most recently completed fiscal year at the time of data capture. The following paragraphs describe each spreadsheet in terms of the data captured and the objective for the data that would be collected. The table numbers used here refer to how the original spreadsheets (found in Appendix D as Figures D-1 through D-4) were identified.

- ◆ *Figure D-1. Percentage of Time Spent Annually on FSC Tasks for FY95.* This worksheet captures the percentage of time each FSC staff member spent annually performing the 13 major FSC programs and services (including TAP). The objective of this table was twofold; to determine

how much time the FSC staff was spending collectively on each program or services and to be able to quantify the interrelationships between the various staff members and functions.

- ◆ *Figure D-2. Percentage of Time Spent Annually on Transition Tasks for FY95.* This worksheet enabled us to account for the distribution of the staff resources used in the delivery of TAP services by TAP function. Although Figure D-2 is similar in appearance to Figure D-1, it focuses just on the TAP. It captures the percentage of time each FSC staff member spends annually performing specific transition tasks, for example, "Maintain Resource Center/Help customers use it" or "Plan and Conduct Job/Career Fairs." Figure D-1 and D-2, collectively, provide a basis for us to compute labor resources and costs for operating each of the FSC programs, including those for each TAP function.
- ◆ *Figure D-3. FSC Nonlabor Costs for FY95.* Table 3 is designed to capture all FSC nonlabor costs, including the expenditure of transition specific (2-S) nonlabor costs for cost categories such as supplies, equipment, printing, training, travel, and nonpersonal services contracts. When the nonlabor costs reported in Table 3 are coupled with the computed labor costs derived from Table 1 and 2, the total costs of providing transition services at each base can be determined.
- ◆ *Figure D-4. Basic Demographic Data for FY95.* Our final table was used to capture basic demographic data from each base, such as assigned population, number of separations and retirements, and the number of transition customer contacts. This data is needed to put all the other cost and workload data in proper perspective.

Conducting a Pilot Test

We conducted a pilot test of the forms and instructions at the 21 bases in the ACC to validate spreadsheet design and use. These bases gave us a diverse group of transition sites, including two overseas sites, and also served as a test of the feasibility of electronic data collection. The spreadsheets were sent electronically to each base via FAMNET, a privately operated Air Force-wide network that links all FSCs, the MAJCOMs, and Air Force Headquarters. Completed forms were returned to LMI through the same channel.⁵

The pilot test validated that the forms and instructions were understandable to the program managers in the field. It also proved that we could efficiently collect the data we needed via electronic means. A preliminary analysis of the pilot data also demonstrated that the information captured was adequate for the analytic procedures planned in this study.

⁵ There were a few exceptions to this procedure, which resulted from data-link problems.

Worldwide Data Collection

After making slight revisions to the spreadsheets, instructions, and collection procedures, the forms were distributed electronically Air Force-wide. As a result of the excellent cooperation from each FSC, we achieved a quick response and a high rate of total return. Of the 91 TAP sites operating in FY95, 84 bases (92 percent) returned completed forms.

Assessment of Data Collected

Given the size and scope of our data-collection effort, large volumes of very detailed resource and workload data were collected. Because of its volume, and the extensive computations that were employed to translate the raw data into information for subsequent analysis, we present only a summary of the data captured and formulation in the main body of this report. More detailed descriptions of the data and its assessment are available in Appendix D. The summary assessments that follow appear in approximately the same sequence as used in Appendix D to facilitate reference to further detail if it is desired.

Quantification of the Interrelationship of FSC Positions

The basic data collected from the 84 FSCs reflected the expenditure of total staff resources in terms of time by FSC program and, within the TAP, in terms of specific TAP functions. The interrelationship and team effort of the FSC staff that was evident in Table 4-1 and in the detailed diagram of TAP functions in Appendix C, could now be quantified.

Using the series of statistical steps that are described in Appendix D, we created a mathematical summary of the expenditure of FSC staff labor. From that, we could determine the net labor resources expended by each staff position and attribute that labor expenditure to specific FSC programs. While these data can be displayed as a total of the 84 bases that responded (as it is in Appendix D), when it is displayed as an average for all the reporting bases it is more representative of what is occurring at a typical USAF installation. Table 4-2 is an excerpt of the type of data collected. It shows the amount of time in selected FSC positions, other than TAP positions, spent supporting TAP in FY95.

Table D-2 in Appendix D demonstrates this interchange in considerably greater detail. Basically, the data in that table is an estimate by each member of the FSC staff showing how time is spent, by program and position, on an annual basis in FY95. Those data clearly illustrate the integration of the FSC work force, including the TAP staff. It also shows that all assigned FSC staff members spend a portion of their time on other programs outside their primary area of responsibility.

Table 4-2. Interrelationship of FSC Staff Efforts—FY95

Position title	Amount of time spent annually on TAP functions (%)
FSC Director	7
Spouse Employment Program Manager	9
Relocation Assistance Manager	4
VA Work Study Program ^a	38
Administration/Secretary	6

^a A VA program that places students receiving VA educational benefits in a work environment compatible with their educational program.


Using the FSC program database, we can now summarize the net impact of this sharing of program responsibilities as it affects the TAP. Overall, at the average installation, the TAP gains about one FTE of staff resources each year. Conversely, the TAP staff at the average installation provides about one-half of an FTE of their total available staff time to other FSC programs. The net effect of this team effort is that the TAP *gains* about one-half an FTE at the average installation.

Distribution of Staff Effort Among TAP Functions

The data collected in our second worksheet (illustrated in Appendix D, Figure D-2) was used to determine how the total staff resources (in FTEs) available to the TAP were expended on the various functions of the TAP (e.g., conducting pre-separation counseling, maintaining the resource center, and conducting job fairs). From these data, we could determine the portion of TAP staff efforts consumed in administration and the portion that went to “customer assistance.” As Figure 4-1 shows, 84 percent of all TAP staff resources were used for customer assistance. While we were unable to find a universally accepted standard for the division of labor between program management and customer interface for service industries, it is our opinion that 84 percent devoted to customer interface, represents a very efficient proportion.

This information illustrates the strong customer orientation in TAP offices, yet the real value of this information is for USAF TAP managers. Using this type of information, they can review the operational efficiency of individual TAP offices. The amount of available staff time consumed in performance of administrative tasks in an individual TAP office can be compared with the Air Force average. If the individual office significantly exceeds the average, the MAJCOM staff may want to conduct a staff assistance visit to that office to find out why administrative tasks are detracting from customer service. Another effective use of this informa-

Figure 4-1. Distribution of Staff Effort—FY95



tion would be to make the Air Force averages available to the MAJCOMs and individual TAP offices for their use as a benchmark in their own operational improvement processes. This database and accompanying spreadsheets have been provided to the Air Force for use in their continued management efforts.

TAP Cost Computations

To this point, our examination of FSC and TAP data has used FTEs for labor and dollar expenditures for nonlabor costs. In order to evaluate total program costs, we had to convert all our labor FTE data into dollars.


The Air Force Family Matters Office provided LMI the “top down” labor funding for each MAJCOM TAP, but, these data do not include any lower level cost center visibility because they are unavailable. The data did not enable us to review and compare transition assistance costs with other FSC program costs. To support an Air Force-wide evaluation of resource utilization, we computed a cost per staff member, per program, and per function on the basis of the survey data provided by 84 of 91 FSCs.

The 84 bases that responded to our data call provided grade and other information on all FSC staff positions, including the annual percentage of time each staff member spends on FSC programs and transition assistance functions. Using the grade levels reported by each base and data from the 1996 federal civilian and military pay tables, we determined a notional cost for each position by assigning a mid-range salary for each grade level and multiplying that amount by a benefits

factor to arrive at a fully burdened labor cost for each position.⁶ These “per position” costs were then converted into dollars for each FSC program and TAP function using the reported distribution of FTEs discussed earlier in this chapter (see Appendix D for details).

Using the available cost center data, we can now construct illustrations that account for total program costs and put them into perspective. Figure 4-2, shows the relationship of total TAP costs at the average USAF installation. Labor represents the greatest outlay, 77 percent of total expenditures. It is clear from this fact that the greatest opportunities for long-term efficiencies are in the management of labor costs.

Figure 4-2. Distribution of Total TAP Expenditures




The database LMI constructed also facilitates the examination of the subelements of nonlabor costs. In FY95, the largest element of TAP nonlabor costs Air Force-wide was equipment, which constituted 54 percent of the total. This can be explained in part by large computer purchases that year. It also suggests that some short-term budget cuts can be achieved by reducing new equipment outlays. Naturally, that is a short-run measure because equipment eventually must be replaced as it wears out or is outmoded. Figure 4-3, shows the distribution of nonlabor costs at the average base.

Upon completion of the preceding computations, we could estimate cost center expenditures (labor and nonlabor) at the installation level. We also developed the ability to compute MAJCOM and Air Force-wide averages or averages for geographical areas. This information can be used by Air Force program managers in

⁶ The benefits factor we used (0.258) was developed by LMI and is intended to reflect approximate costs for all civilian employee benefits.

Figure 4-3. Distribution of TAP Nonlabor Expenditures



much the same way as the FTE computations discussed in the preceding paragraph. Perhaps more importantly, using dollars as a common denominator, both labor and nonlabor TAP costs can be combined for total program cost analyses, at the individual installation, MAJCOM, or Air Force-wide level.

MACRO COST ANALYSIS

In the remainder of this chapter, we examine program costs primarily at the macro (Air Force-wide) level. To prepare this macroview, we first looked at the total cost and labor data collected from the 84 bases that responded to our data call. We began with the costs that had been computed using the methodology and adjustment factors described in Appendix D. By combining total computed TAP labor costs and reported total nonlabor costs, we calculated the total costs for operating TAP at the 84 bases that we collected data from. This can be expressed as

$$\text{TAP labor costs} + \text{TAP nonlabor costs} = \text{total TAP costs} =$$

$$\$8,154,396 + \$2,497,460 = \$10,651,856 \text{ total TAP costs.}$$

Next, we divided this “bottom up” calculation by the 60,310 separations and retirements in FY95 at the 84 reporting bases to determine the per capita costs of providing transition services for each separatee in FY95. These calculations are

$$\text{Total TAP costs} \div \text{FY95 military separations} = \text{per capita TAP costs} =$$

$$\$10,651,856 \div 60,310 = \$177 \text{ per capita TAP costs.}$$

VALIDATION PROCESS

The cost of \$177 per military separation was the end product of data computations gathered from 84 individual installations. Because these data were being used for many comparisons and would be used for internal Air Force management decisions, we wanted to validate their reliability and accuracy. This validation was accomplished by comparing the “bottom up” computation summarized in the previous paragraph, to the total TAP funding allocated by the Air Force Family Matters Office for all 91 operational sites and 8 MAJCOM headquarters. This “top down” calculation, which reflects actual budget allocations for FY95, is

$$\text{TAP labor + nonlabor allocation} = \text{total FY95 TAP allocation} =$$
$$\$9.1 \text{ million} + \$2.8 \text{ million} = \$11.9 \text{ million total FY95 TAP allocation.}$$

To determine a per capita cost, we divided the Air Force total TAP budget allocation by the actual FY95 military separation and retirement numbers. We used the year-end numbers compiled by the Air Force and reported as their official separation and retirements numbers to OSD in their annual personnel plans.

$$\text{Total TAP allocation} \div \text{total separations} = \text{FY95 per capita allocation} =$$
$$\$11.9 \text{ million} \div 63,750 = \$187 \text{ per capita TAP cost.}$$

The computed “bottom up” per capita cost (\$177) is 5 percent less than the “top down” number (\$187) computed from FY95 budget numbers and actual FY95 separation and retirement numbers. The 5 percent difference can be accounted for by the HQ, USAF and MAJCOM Headquarters costs and actual cost adjustments. Based on this, the data used for the installation level and Air Force average computations and comparisons used in this chapter are statistically valid for our purposes.

Although the bottom up computed values were validated and used for internal Air Force evaluations, it is appropriate to use the top down, or actual budgeted per capita cost figure of \$187 as the “official” Air Force cost. We will use this \$187 cost in interservice comparisons in the following chapter.⁷

⁷ By contrast, the Air Force spent about \$3,300 in FY95 to attract each new recruit. This is over 17 times more cost to attract new service members than to prepare them for reentry into the civilian labor market. Source: Director, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Accession Policy, Force Management Policy, 10 December 1996.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS IN THIS CHAPTER

- ◆ All FSC staff members participate, to varying degrees, in the delivery of TAP services. On average, TAP gains one-half of an FTE per base from other programs in the FSC.
- ◆ Some required transition services, such as relocation assistance, spouse employment, and financial counseling, are delivered by the FSC staff members who provide this service to all FSC customers, not just those separating.
- ◆ There are substantial inconsistencies in the customer data captured from installation to installation.
- ◆ Labor is the largest part of TAP expenditures, accounting for 77 percent of total outlays.
- ◆ Eighty-four percent of all TAP staff labor resources are used for direct customer assistance.
- ◆ In the Air Force, TAP costs \$187 per separatee.

Chapter 5

Analysis

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the information collected in the first three steps of this study. Our analysis is based on the application of the methodology we selected for this study, an adaptation of a benchmarking technique. Before beginning the analytic discussion, we explain why we selected this methodology.

SELECTION OF A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In Chapter 1, we discussed the two potential methodologies we contemplated for use in this study. They were

- ◆ the development and use of criteria to rank alternatives and
- ◆ the use of a benchmarking technique.

As we explained in Chapter 1, we did not make a final decision on which methodology would be used until we had completed the first three steps of the study (conduct background research, describe the discrete functions required to deliver the service, and data collection).

The insight we gained in the process of accomplishing those steps made it evident that a modified benchmarking methodology was more appropriate for this study. Our rationale for this conclusion is as follows:

- ◆ As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the transition services provided by DoD are clearly specified in law. Therefore, it was not necessary to determine through the application of selected criteria which services should or should not be provided.
- ◆ The functions of the USAF transition program are closely integrated with other FSC programs. The process of separating the individual TAP functions for the purpose of applying criteria to rank the functions or to determine which were “core” is made very difficult by this. Additionally, prioritizing the 11 TAP functions would have had relatively little meaning because at most locations they were performed by only two people.

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- ◆ Finally, the use of sophisticated groupware and computerized decision-making software was not warranted. Its application to rank alternatives for a program of the small size of TAP (a total of 194 positions worldwide) would not have been an efficient use of research resources or the time involved in assembling focus groups of experts, customers, and managers.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss the application of our modified benchmarking technique, its use in analysis, and the findings from its application.

THREE ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY MODELS

The first step in the application of our benchmarking methodology was to develop a set of alternative models for TAP service delivery. Our objective was to take a close look at how customer services are delivered in other similar programs or settings, determine whether any of these delivery methods might have applicability to the TAP, and assess the advantages and disadvantages of delivering TAP services using each model.

We were especially interested in reviewing delivery models that had the potential to offer operating efficiency and overall program effectiveness, while satisfying customer needs. This review includes examining the possibility of contracting delivery of transition services to the private sector. While there may be any number of ways to deliver these TAP services, we selected three models for comparison: QOL, Commission on Roles and Missions/Office of Management and Budget (CORM/OMB), and the ACAP model. Each model is discussed separately below.

Quality of Life Model

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Air Force considers TAP an important QoL program. We used a QoL model for our first benchmarking analysis because it permitted us to examine how the Air Force delivers services in other QoL programs (e.g., housing referral, healthcare, education, libraries, and chaplains) and then compare their delivery means to that of transition services. The QoL programs we selected for benchmarking were those that were most similar to TAP in terms of mission, organization, staffing, customers, and apparent mode of service delivery. We can apply these same factors (hypothetically) to the transition program and assess the pros and cons of using this service delivery model for TAP. This model envisions all, or nearly all, services being performed in-house by Air Force employees, just as in the case of TAP since its inception.

To gain a better understanding of other QoL programs, we reviewed applicable policy guidance and conducted interviews with appropriate QoL program managers. Through this process, we determined that the majority of QoL programs most comparable to TAP are now accomplished almost entirely in-house by Air Force civilian or military employees. There is some local contracting out of specific

functions or tasks, such as testing or counseling specialists in the base education office.¹ Another exception to the standard Air Force QoL model is the military healthcare delivery system.

Most of the QoL programs serve a mixed customer base, comprised largely of local military members, their families, civilian employees, and a few retirees. Their missions involve many of the same elements found in the TAP, such as counseling, educating, and providing a variety of individual services, most of which are offered on base during scheduled operating hours. There are often referrals and follow-up visits. Participation may be encouraged or required, and command support is usually strong.

The Air Force housing referral program and library system both use in-house Air Force civilians and some military members as their standard staffing model.² There is currently some limited regionalization (combining of functions or offices within a geographic location) among QoL programs, for example in housing referral offices in some overseas areas. Program managers for base libraries are also looking into possibilities to increase regionalization and/or contracting out.

Two program managers expressed some concern associated with contracting out in their respective areas. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains expressed major concerns about potential problems if contract chaplains were deployed with combat forces or rapid reaction forces.³ The housing referral office was also unsure how certain issues would be handled if this function is contracted out—specifically, its contracting authority regarding the housing set-aside program and its representation of the government in settling landlord/tenant disputes.⁴

One of the largest and most expensive QoL functions is military healthcare. It is actively pursuing a policy of contracting out and regionalization of the military healthcare system through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)/Tricare managed healthcare system.⁵ While military hospitals will continue to function at most major military installations, their focus will be primarily on the active duty force. Eligible nonactive duty beneficiaries will be offered three healthcare options—a health maintenance organization (HMO), a preferred provider option (PPO), and a standard CHAMPUS option.

¹ Interview with Mr. Al Arrighi, Air Force Director of Education Programs, February 13, 1996.

² Housing referral assists military members (and civilians overseas) and their families in locating suitable off-base housing. They may also manage the assignment of on-base housing or off-base government leased quarters.

³ Interview with Chaplain (Colonel) Jack D. Williamson, Chief, Plans and Programs Division, Air Force Chief of Chaplains Office, February 13, 1996.

⁴ Interview with Ms. Kathy Hurt, Directorate of Housing, Office of the Civil Engineer, March 22, 1996.

⁵ Telephone interview with Major Dale Villani, Managed Care Policy Officer, Office of the Air Force Surgeon General, February 6, 1996.

This new healthcare system is being phased in by region over the next several years.

The implications of applying the QoL model to the TAP are that virtually all aspects of TAP, including staffing, would remain generally the same as they are today. Like the majority of all other Air Force QoL programs, under this model, TAP remains an in-house program staffed largely by Air Force civilians. Use of some military resources, and a few individual contractors, as well as some non-chargeable labor, such as VA work studies and volunteers performing TAP functions, would be compatible with this model.

Commission on Roles and Missions/Office of Management and Budget Model

The May 1995 report of the CORM and numerous earlier publications by the OMB are the basis for this benchmarking model.⁶ All of the CORM and OMB documents emphasize the importance of contracting out those functions defined by OMB as commercial activities that are normally performed by the private sector.

A recent Air Force talking paper on the commercial activities (A-76) program stated that all “[Air Force] functions are either inherently governmental or commercial activities.”⁷ These two terms are defined in Air Force and DoD publications as follows:⁸

Inherently Governmental Function—A function related so intimately to the public interest as to mandate performance by DoD personnel (military or civilian). These functions include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying governmental authority or the use of value judgment in making decisions for the government.

Commercial Activity (CA)—An activity that provides a product or service which is obtainable from a commercial source. An Air Force CA is not an inherently governmental function. It may be an entire organization or part of an organization. The work must be separable from other functions or activities so that it is suitable for performance by contract. An Air Force CA falls into one of two categories: 1) an in-house CA, operated by Air Force personnel (military and/or civilian); and, 2) a contract CA, operated with contractor personnel.

⁶ Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, 24 May 1995.

⁷ Air Force Talking Paper, *The Air Force Commercial Activities (A-76) Program*, Annie L. Andrews, HQ, USAF/PEM, 22 January 1996.

⁸ DoDD 4100.15, *Commercial Activities Program*, 12 August 1985, p. 2-1.

We used the CORM/OMB guidance as a model to examine how delivery of TAP services might be accomplished in a contracted mode. There are three basic steps to using this model: 1) determine whether a function is a commercial activity or an inherently governmental function, as defined by OMB policy; 2) if it is a commercial activity, determine if there is any reason it should not be outsourced; and 3) if it is determined appropriate for contracting, develop a most efficient organization (MEO), as defined by OMB policy, then compete the in-house operation against commercial bidders. If the cost advantage to the government is at least 10 percent, the function is contracted out.⁹

Based on the preceding official Air Force definitions of commercial activities and inherently governmental functions, we believe all but two TAP functions are commercial activities. Those two exceptions are that; (1) no contract employee is permitted to commit government funds, and (2) no contract employee may supervise a government employee. By definition, these two functions are inherently governmental functions and should not be contracted. Strictly speaking, these two restrictions can be overcome relatively easily. The supervisory or fiduciary function relating to the TAP could be performed by some other government employee (most likely the FSC director or deputy).

A concern we could not resolve is how, or if, the TAP could continue to use supplemental labor resources such as the VA work studies, volunteers, and temporarily assigned military personnel, some of whom are government employees. The issue is not entirely that some of these resources are government employees. Rather, the issue is how does a contractor use a supplemental work force, especially volunteers, without a possible conflict of interest. This is not an inconsequential matter, this source of supplemental labor represents about 15 percent of the total FSC FTEs to TAP in our FY95 database. Notwithstanding this concern, the bottomline is that there is no policy impediment to contracting out TAP services. This is not an argument in favor of doing so, it only means that it is permissible.

Accepting the fact that providing transition assistance is a commercial activity which may be contracted out, the second step in our examination of this model is to determine if there is any reason it should not be outsourced. DoD has established certain criteria for determining when it may be appropriate to exempt in-house commercial activities from A-76 competition. For example, if an in-house commercial activity is determined critical to national defense, or if there is no satisfactory commercial source available, or if it would be in the best interest of providing direct patient care, the activity "shall be retained in-house without a cost comparison."¹⁰ Based on a full review of the DoD criteria, it does not appear that TAP qualifies for exemption from contracting out.

⁹ All definitions referred to in this section come from the Revised Supplemental Handbook of OMB Circular A-76, *Performance of Commercial Activities*, March 1996.

¹⁰ DoD Instruction 4100.33, *Commercial Activities Program Procedures*, 9 September 1985.

The third step in using the CORM/OMB model is to develop an MEO, as defined by OMB policy, and then conduct competitions and cost comparisons. The MEO is the government's opportunity to assure that the in-house activity is structured in the most efficient and effective manner possible. The MEO is the basis for the government's in-house cost estimate which then competes against the commercial bidders.¹¹ For a commercial bidder to win the competition, his bid must be at least 10 percent less than the in-house bid, the MEO.

Without conducting an actual A-76 competition, it is not possible to determine the outcome with absolute certainty. However, there is existing research and empirical evidence that can provide some insight into the possible outcome of an A-76 competition of the Air Force's TAP. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) reviewed 2,100 A-76 competitions involving nearly 82,000 positions conducted between 1978 and 1994. CNA found that while the average saving to the government was 31 percent from an A-76 competition, competitions involving fewer billets generated substantially lower levels of savings. Competition involving 1 to 10 positions generated average savings of 22 percent.¹² It should also be noted that these savings are not all attributable to contracts, in many cases the A-76 competition was won by the in-house MEO. Recent Air Force experience shows that 40 percent of all USAF A-76 competitions were won by the in-house competitor.¹³

Air Force contracts for services such as transition are decentralized, base-level contracts. The Air Force does not have a mechanism for centralized service contracts. This means that the transition program would be contracted base by base. There would be as many as 91 contracts to administer.¹⁴ Since these contracts would be for one or two positions in 93 percent of the FSCs, it is unlikely that they will generate significant savings. In addition, due to the small number of positions, TAP would likely be contracted through direct conversions rather than A-76 competitions. This would eliminate the opportunity to develop and compete a more efficient in-house program staffed by government civilians.

Army Career and Alumni Program Model

The third alternative we benchmarked is the Army ACAP model, in which we examined how the Army delivers transition services and compared that delivery system with the current Air Force practice. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Army

¹¹ See Note 10, this chapter.

¹² CNA briefing presented to Federal Privatization III Conference, 2 April 1996.

¹³ HQ, USAF (SAF/AQK) Memorandum, "OSD Privatization IPT, 23 October 95, to Review Outsourcing/Privatization Opportunities," October 1995.

¹⁴ There is no legal restriction that prevents the Air Force from having consolidated contracts (either at the MAJCOM or service-wide level). Contracting structure and procedures are not controlled by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (which is responsible for TAP). HQ, USAF/PEM sets contracting policy and has established the current structure and procedures. There is no indication that USAF/PEM plans to change this particular policy.

transition delivery model represents the most different staffing and organizational approach among the four Services. ACAP is actually a mix of in-house services provided by the TAO and contracted services provided by the JAC. During FY95, the Army began expanding the contracted portion of ACAP to include all functions, except the TSM position. A detailed background discussion of ACAP is provided in Chapter 3.

Our analysis begins with specific program comparisons between the ACAP and Air Force TAP models as shown in Table 5-1. This table compares the program emphasis, management, staffing, and funding of the two programs. Perhaps the most significant finding we made regarding the Army ACAP is that it embraces a different philosophy about the TAP than exists in the Air Force. This philosophical difference is manifested primarily in the increased emphasis by the Army on job placement. Our observations of ACAP operations at eight different sites and extensive discussions with ACAP program managers indicate that the Army goes to greater lengths to actually connect prospective employees (soldiers) with employers. This view is supported by their Army Employer and Alumni Network (AEAN), by the "Hot (job) Leads" Program and by the active employer recruitment undertaken by contractor personnel in the JAC. It is also supported by the fact that the Army committed \$16.7 million in FY95 to operate the contract JACs, which focuses primarily on the job search aspects of transition.

Table 5-1. Army and Air Force Transition Program Comparison

Army ACAP model	Air Force TAP model
Emphasis on job placement	Emphasis on transition preparedness
Stand-alone function	Fully integrated with FSC
Government staff (3–5 per site)	Government staff (2–4 per site)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Group counseling the norm ◆ Pre-separation checklist ◆ Referral to service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Individual counseling ◆ One-stop assistance ◆ Clients get job search training
Contract staff (4 or more per site)	Some limited local contracting for specific services (less than 2 percent of the total staff effort)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Job search training ◆ Active employer recruitment ◆ AEAN network and hot leads 	
\$12.5 million OSD (2S) funds	\$11.9 million OSD (2S) funds
\$16.7 million HQ, Army funds added for JAC contract	No added funding by HQ, USAF

Table 5-2 presents an operational and structural view of the two transition programs. The structural differences between the ACAP and Air Force TAP models are quite noticeable. The Army operates fewer transition sites than the Air Force,

but the populations that are served by each transition office are substantially larger in the Army. This translates into more separations, and therefore transition clients, at the average ACAP office than the average TAP office. These greater numbers account for much of the richer staffing in ACAP offices shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-2. Army and Air Force Transition Program Operational Comparison

Army ACAP	Air Force TAP
55 transition sites	91 transition sites
3,000–45,000 military population per post or installation	600–10,000 military population per base or installation
106,191 military separations and retirements	63,750 military separations and retirements

BASING STRUCTURE DIFFERENCES

The significant differences between the Army's and Air Force's basing structures have had a major affect on their transition programs that bears closer examination. Table 5-3 presents added detail to these structural differences.

Table 5-3. ACAP and TAP Transition Sites

Installation size	Army ACAP		Air Force TAP	
	Posts	ACAP sites	Bases	TAP sites
600 to 1,150	50	14	16	13
1,501 to 3,000	23	16	20	20
3,001 to 4,500	9	9	25	25
4,501 to 6,000	7	7	18	18
6,001 to 8,000	2	2	11	11
8,001 to 11,000	6	6	3	3
11,000 to 15,000	3	3	1	1
15,000 to 20,000	4	4	—	—
20,000 to 25,000	1	1	—	—
25,001 to 40,000		—	—	—
Over 40,000	2	2	—	—
Total	105	64	94	91

Source: Installation data from FY95 FORMIS database. ACAP data from ACAP homepage. Some data may not match precisely, but, the illustrated differences in Army and Air Force basing structure is still valid.

The Army has fewer transition sites than the Air Force even though the Army has more bases. Forty-one Army bases do not have a permanent ACAP while only 3 Air Force bases are without TAP. The Army uses mobile teams to cover the bases that do not have their own ACAP. This means that the service is not available on

an every day basis to service members at these bases. These service members either wait for the mobile ACAP team, travel to another base, or forego having any transition assistance. ACAP sites tend to be located at installations with much larger military populations—two of the ACAP sites served posts that had more than 40,000 soldiers assigned (Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Hood, Texas). Overall, only 4 percent of Air Force sites are at locations with a population of over 8,000, while 25 percent of the ACAP sites are in that category. This basing structure offers substantial economies of scale to the Army ACAP not available to the Air Force.

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The Army has a very effective management information system (MIS) that they operate jointly with their contractor. The ACAP MIS provides key program management data to all levels of the ACAP organizational structure on a “real time” on-line basis. It avoids duplication of client data capture (once a clients transition data is entered, it is available no matter where the client goes for assistance). By comparison, the Air Force’s TAP has no real MIS. There are quarterly reports, but these are generated manually and, as discussed in Chapter 4, have significant shortcomings which limiting their use as a tool for management. Table 5-4 compares the two services systems.

Table 5-4. Comparison of Army and Air Force Data Systems

Army	Air Force
<p>MIS provides standard database</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Tracks client status ◆ Tracks ACAP workload ◆ Provides VA, DoL and DoD benefits information ◆ Data accessible Army-wide ◆ Can distinguish between number of clients and number of visits ◆ Creates counseling schedule <p>Plan to integrate with Army's personnel MIS</p>	<p>No standardized Air Force-wide TAP database</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Emphasis on capturing quarterly reports data ◆ Does not distinguish between “clients” and “visits” ◆ Manual reporting ◆ Some locally developed databases (spreadsheets) <p>No connection to the Air Force's personnel data system</p>

COST COMPARISONS

Comparisons with the requirements in law showed that both the Army and Air Force models deliver all required transition services, but, in different ways to meet service-unique basing structures and different transition program philosophies. These different approaches resulted in different program costs. We made three separate cost comparisons under different assumptions. The first comparison was

a straight per capita cost comparison using the same methodology discussed in Chapter 4, where we simply divided total military separations and retirements with the total transition program budget. We computed the Army per capita cost to be \$275 that compares very closely with the Army's own estimate of \$300 per client. Table 5-5 compares Army and Air Force costs.

Table 5-5. Per Capita Costs—FY95

Army ACAP model	Air Force TAP model
Per capita cost: \$275 per separation	Per capita cost: \$187 per separation

We made two additional cost comparisons using different program assumptions. These cost comparisons represent a realistic approximation of probable Air Force costs and potential contractor costs based on available data.¹⁵ The following discussion provides legitimate contracting scenarios, and cost computation, but is based only on the known costs of one contract that provides transition services. Additionally, a surcharge is levied by the Army for other services who use the ACAP contract (for example, the Navy's use of the RCI contract to provide ship-board transition assistance). At the time of our interview with ACAP managers, the surcharge was 20 percent, but the Army officials indicated that they hoped to reduce the surcharge to between 8 to 10 percent. Because of the uncertainty of the exact amount of the surcharge, we have not included it in the following computations.

For the purposes of this analysis, we assumed the Air Force would proceed along either of the following two options in adopting the ACAP model.

- ◆ *Option 1.* Under this option, the Air Force would retain its current integrated TAP/FSC structure with an emphasis on transition preparedness and simply replace its TAP staff of 178 FTEs on a one-for-one basis with contract employees. This option envisions that the Air Force would use the Army ACAP contract. The approximate cost of this option is based on an estimate of the cost per contract counselor using information provided by the Army. We assumed in our calculations that in riding the Army contract the Air Force would be expected to pay a comparable cost per counselor (labor plus capital costs). To estimate a cost, we divided the total cost of the contract by an estimated number of counselors. We were unable to assume any discount that may be available to new customers, such as the Air Force, or that may be available if the Air Force declined some of the automation support the Army currently receives from the contractor. Based on the methodology described, we estimated a cost of \$75,300 per counselor, including the contractor over-

¹⁵ The Air Force per capita costs provided in this report include those costs currently funded in the transition budget. They do not include costs paid by other budget appropriations, for example, health benefits for retired former employees.

head and capital costs. The cost estimate for this option of replacing Air Force TAP staff with contractor personnel (without surcharge) is

$$\$75,300 \times 178 \text{ TAP FTEs} = \$13.4 \text{ million}$$

$$\$13.4 \text{ million} \div 63,750 = \$210 \text{ per separatee.}$$

Even without the addition of a surcharge, adoption of option 1 would increase Air Force TAP costs by approximately 12 percent over actual FY95 expenditures.

- ◆ *Option 2.* The Air Force could also elect to replicate the Army ACAP at all of its 91 sites. In this case, the Air Force must adopt a different transition philosophy and restructure the FSC to permit a stand-alone Air Force model like the ACAP. This option also envisions that the Air Force would use the Army ACAP contract under which it would incur a contract surcharge. Again, because of the uncertainty of the exact amount of the surcharge, we have not included it in this computation. Our estimate of the cost of this option is based on applying the same percentage (57 percent) of supplemental funding that the Army does to earmarked transition funding received from OSD. The cost estimate for this option (without surcharge) is

$$\$11.9 \text{ million} \times 57 \text{ percent} = \$6.8 \text{ million}$$

$$\$11.9 \text{ million} + \$6.8 \text{ million} = \$18.7 \text{ million}$$

$$\$18.7 \text{ million} \div 63,750 = \$293 \text{ per separatee.}$$

If the Air Force were to adopt the ACAP model, it would mean adopting a different philosophy, which would

- ◆ increase costs and
- ◆ could require restructuring the FSC, resulting in a loss of team synergy.

To summarize, both the Army and Air Force transition programs meet all statutory requirements, but, there are substantial program differences between the two. The ACAP places greater emphasis on job assistance, while the Air Force focuses more on overall transition preparedness. Army transition program funding is supplemented by 57 percent from Army Operations and Maintenance (O&M) resources to pay for the JAC contract. Current Air Force per capita costs are about

one-third lower than the Army's.¹⁶ Finally, integration of TAP with other FSC programs provides several benefits, not the least of which is one-stop transition assistance.

EVALUATION OF MODELS

The next step of our process is to evaluate each model. We will discuss the pros and cons of each model in the following terms: Does it meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) guidance to contract out all “commercial activities?” Does it increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the TAP? Does it affect the synergy of the current FSC structure? Is it likely to produce significant cost savings?

Quality of Life Model

Following the QoL model leads to keeping the TAP in the FSC, delivered by government employees. TAP would not be competed under A-76, so there would be no associated costs of contract administration. Conversely, there would be no requirement to restructure the TAP organization to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. This model does *not* satisfy the DEPSECDEF guidance to contract commercial activities. Our assessment of applying this model to the TAP is summarized in Table 5-6.

Table 5-6. Pros and Cons of the QoL Model

Pros	Cons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Keeps TAP in FSC and maintains integrity of current program ◆ Improved efficiency possible through redistribution of resources ◆ No cost incurred from A-76 competition or contract administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Inconsistent with DEPSECDEF emphasis on outsourcing ◆ Difficult to react to budget cuts and workload changes ◆ Development of MEO not required

¹⁶ A study conducted by an independent firm for the Army reported the industry average for private-sector transition services is approximately \$3,500 per client. Because that study did not identify the services provided or whether the participant's salaries were included in the estimate, direct program-to-program cost comparisons would not be valid. Additionally, neither TAP nor ACAP costs include facility costs, which are included in the private industry estimated costs. Nevertheless, the industry average represents an order of magnitude increase over either TAP per capita costs (\$187) or the Army's FY95 estimate of \$300 per client. Source: KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, *Benchmarking Demonstration Study Report* (undated, prepared in 1995).

Commission on Roles and Missions/Office of Management and Budget Model

This model is consistent with the DEPSECDEF guidance and would require the application of the A-76 competition process to the TAP. This would result in the opportunity to form an MEO using government employees. However, because of the decentralized contracting process and small number of positions at each base, savings are unlikely and there will be costs associated with administering the contracts. The entire FSC would have to be restructured, potentially eliminating the synergy that benefits the TAP now. There also will be adverse impacts on employee morale. Table 5-7 reflects our assessment of the pros and cons of this model.

Table 5-7. Pros and Cons of the CORM/OMB Model

Pros	Cons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Consistent with DEPSECDEF emphasis on outsourcing ◆ Development of MEO required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Small TAP work force unlikely to produce significant savings ◆ Cost and time to conduct A-76 competition and administer contracts ◆ Need to restructure TAP and FSC; loss of team synergy ◆ Adverse impact on employee morale during A-76 competition

This assessment is consistent with the scope of this study, that is, an examination of alternatives for the delivery of transition assistance. The examination of an alternative that would encompass outsourcing more FSC programs than the TAP, or even the entire FSC, was not addressed. Increasing the number of FSC programs to be outsourced could result in a different assessment. It would potentially overcome one of the limiting factors by increasing the number of positions to be outsourced at each base. It would not necessarily overcome the effect of outsourcing on the team synergy that now exists in Air Force FSCs, and it would still have to be evaluated in the context of the Air Force's decentralized contracting structure. In fall 1996, the Human Resources Development Division (AF/DPCH) initiated an internal review of the possibility of outsourcing all FSC programs.

Army Career and Alumni Program Model

The ACAP model has several advantages. First, it is consistent with DEPSECDEF guidance. Since it already is a working TAP, it would bypass the need for the Air Force to initiate its own contract. The ACAP offers access to the Army's job-lead programs, the "outside the gate" features. The largest and overriding disadvantage of the ACAP model is cost. Our analysis indicates that adopting this model would

increase the Air Force's costs by one-third or more. Table 5-8 reflects our assessment of the ACAP model.

Table 5-8. Pros and Cons of the ACAP Model

Pros	Cons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Consistent with DEPSECDEF emphasis on outsourcing ◆ Model in place and working successfully to meet Army requirements and philosophy ◆ Better access to Army's "outside the gate" features ◆ Better use of technology to support the program ◆ Avoids A-76 competition and contract administration costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Costs more (even without Army surcharge) than current method model ◆ Would have to restructure TAP and FSC, causing loss of team synergy ◆ No incentive to develop an MEO to improve current operational model ◆ Would displace current Air Force employees; adverse morale impact during conversion ◆ Could require change in transition philosophy

It can be legitimately questioned if the differences between the two services approaches are justified. Is the Army paying too much for ACAP or, conversely, is the Air Force neglecting to provide full service to its military and civilian members? During the course of our research, including site visits to 8 separate TAP offices and the prototype survey of 240 TAP customers, there was no indication that the Air Force was providing inadequate services.

In all QoL programs, including the TAP, each service has to make a conscious decision about the level of service that is appropriate for its members. The Army has made its decision to provide more specific job search assistance to its members, perhaps because many Army skills are not as readily transferable to civilian occupations as those of the Air Force. Additionally, the Army believes that the added costs of employer outreach programs, such as AEAN and its Army hot leads are necessary to provide the level of transition services they want for their soldiers and civilian employees. Such decisions are the legitimate prerogative of each service's leadership.

Summary of Model Evaluations

On the basis of the preceding analysis, we believe that the QoL model is the most effective organizational and staffing model for the Air Force TAP for the following reasons:

- ◆ The ACAP model offers the Air Force some interesting advantages in the area of technology, but it also would result in the significant disadvantage

of undoing the “team” approach the Air Force has used very successfully. Even more of a disadvantage is the resultant increase in operational costs.

- ◆ The CORM/OMB model also offers some important advantages in the area of organizational design to promote efficient and effective operations. Its major disadvantage is that the decentralized contracts that would result from selecting this model will greatly disrupt the operations of the entire FSC and not provide any significant cost savings.

We believe that the Air Force can continue to deliver transition services using the QoL model, but that it should consider incorporating the benefits of the other two models into its service delivery. That is, some organizational redesign should be undertaken to better match workload to resources and make better use of technology to decrease the human workload. Chapter 6 discusses these issues in greater detail.

In summary, while all three program models satisfy all requirements of the law, we find substantial advantages in the current Air Force team approach within the FSC. Perhaps more convincing to many observers is the fact that the CORN/OMB alternative does not promise program savings and our assessment of the ACAP alternative indicates that operating costs are likely to increase.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS IN THIS CHAPTER

The key findings in this chapter are as follows:

- ◆ QoL programs similar to the TAP in terms of mission, organization, service provided, and customers are delivered by Air Force civilian employees.
- ◆ All but two TAP functions are commercial activities.
- ◆ Based on DoD’s criteria, TAP functions do not qualify for exemption from contracting out.
- ◆ No policy or law precludes contracting out virtually all TAP functions.
- ◆ The Air Force does not have a mechanism for centralized service contracts; therefore, any TAP contracts would be at base level. There could be as many as 91 contracts to administer if TAP were contracted out.
- ◆ At best, conversions of small numbers of billets, like the TAP at each base, generate relatively small savings. Contract oversight costs can offset any potential savings in this situation.
- ◆ The ACAP has a different philosophy than the Air Force TAP; it places greater emphasis on job assistance.

-
- ◆ The basing structure of the Army, combined with the many separations at most posts, makes it possible for the ACAP to achieve savings associated with economies of scale that are not available to the Air Force because of its basing structure.
 - ◆ The Army has a very effective management information system within its ACAP structure. Customer data are captured once and then become available on-line to any ACAP site in the world. The system also automatically generates all OSD and Army required reports.
 - ◆ The Air Force captures the equivalent program data manually and generates the quarterly reports manually.
 - ◆ Using the methodology of dividing the total ACAP costs by the number of separatees, we estimate that the ACAP costs \$275 per Army separatee compared to TAP costs of \$187 per Air Force separatee.
 - ◆ The QoL model is the most appropriate organizational and staffing model for the Air Force TAP.

Chapter 6

Additional Management Issues Related to the Transition Assistance Program

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter addressed the fundamental issue of “What is the most effective organizational and staffing model for the Air Force transition program?” In this chapter, we address related additional issues that present opportunities for improvements in transition program effectiveness.

ALIGNMENT OF TAP WORK FORCE AND WORKLOAD LEVELS

Work Force Distribution

When the Air Force TAP was initiated, there were no data available to predict what the workload would be at any specific base. In the absence of that information, the total civilian personnel authorizations for the TAP were allocated, somewhat arbitrarily, two to each base. Over the next 5 years, some minor modifications were made to this allocation. Nevertheless, in FY95, over 90 percent of the bases still had two TAP positions authorized.

During our data collection, we asked the FSCs to report how much time each staff member spent delivering TAP services. We also collected demographic data (base population, number of separations and retirements, and the number of TAP customer contacts) relating to the customer workloads. Because we collected this detailed data for each of the 84 bases that responded, we had the opportunity to examine the alignment of work force to workload on a base-by-base basis. We also had the capability to make MAJCOM-by-MAJCOM and regional comparisons.

Comparison of TAP Work Force to Workload Data

A base-level comparison of the work force FTE data with the demographic data showed that there are some significant imbalances between the TAP work force and the demographic factors that are the primary drivers of the TAP workload—base populations and military separations. Tables 6-1 and 6-2 provide summary comparisons of the TAP work force to workload.

TAP staffing across the Air Force is relatively lean. Almost 93 percent of the 84 reporting bases having a TAP staff of two or less FTE positions. However, the TAP workload, whether measured by the size of the population to be serviced or by the number of military separations in FY95, varies significantly from base to base compared to the size of the TAP staff.

Table 6-1. FY95 Summary Comparison of TAP Work Force to Workload

TAP FTE positions/base	Number of bases	Population range	Separation range
1	8	656 to 5,253	14 to 871
2	70	850 to 9,432	45 to 1,494 ^a
3	3	2,793 to 8,733	476 to 833
4	2	7,923 to 9,962	1,127 to 1,527
7 ^b	1	6,433	766
Total	84	387,457	60,310

^a Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, reported 5,160 separations, but because this is a military training base, the majority of these separations were airmen with less than 90 days service. Service members with this limited amount of time in the military are not eligible for full transition services or benefits.

^b The TAP staff have been temporarily augmented with four additional positions at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, because it is a "base realignment and closure site."

Table 6-2. Comparison of Workload to Work Force Ratios

TAP FTE positions per base	Range of workload ratios based on population (population: TAP FTE)	Range of workload ratios based on separations (separations: TAP FTE)
1	656:1 to 5,253:1	14:1 to 871:1
2	425:1 to 4,716:1	23:1 to 747:1
3	931:1 to 2,911:1	159:1 to 278:1
4	1,981:1 to 2,491:1	282:1 to 382:1
7	2,253:1	351:1

Imbalance of Work Force and Workload

The degree of imbalances between the TAP staffing allocations and the workload illustrated in Table 6-1 is even more evident when the data in the last two columns of Table 6-1 are converted to ratios, as shown in Table 6-2. The ratios were computed by dividing the number of staff FTEs into the range of populations served or the range of separations occurring in FY95. The range is significant. For example, bases with two staff FTEs served population ratios of 425:1 to 4,716:1. Using

separations as the workload factor, bases with two staff FTEs served separation ratios that ranged from 23:1 to 747:1.

The substantial imbalances illustrated in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 suggest that the Air Force can improve program efficiency by realigning TAP positions. This is a long-term task, made more complex by the dynamic context of already existing pressures to eliminate positions. In the short run, it may be possible to eliminate some of the imbalances by taking directed staff cuts where obvious staff "richness" exists.

LMI developed an algorithm for allocating existing staffing based on base populations, base separations, or a combination of both workload factors. Since 95 percent of the total TAP customer load is military, and because separations are the primary driver of participation in the TAP, the number of separations at a given installation is generally a valid measure of TAP workload. However, this is not the case for bases overseas. Most military members obtain sufficient service retainability when they are assigned overseas to ensure a year or more of service upon their return to CONUS. They do this because of the inherent difficulties of securing post-service employment from the overseas location. Nevertheless, because they anticipate separation after returning to the CONUS, they often begin their "transition" while they are still overseas. Therefore, for overseas locations, military separations may substantially understate TAP workloads and assigned base populations may be more representative. For example, if separations alone were used as the workload factor in USAFE, the TAP staff at the 10 bases in that command would be reduced by 56 percent. Alternatively, if base population were used, the staff reduction would be only 11 percent. At that point, the reduced USAFE transition staff would approximate the Air Force-wide staff-to-population ratio.

In addition to computing staff distributions for the existing staff levels based on base populations, base separations, or a combination of both workload factors, the algorithm LMI developed is also designed to calculate staffing distributions at the MAJCOM aggregate level. Because there are many extenuating factors that affect staff distribution at the installation level beyond simple workload computations, HQ Air Force TAP managers may want to allocate staffing reallocations by MAJCOM. The MAJCOM managers, with their greater familiarity with local installation situations, may be in a better position to distribute the total staff resources.

The Air Force transition managers are anticipating TAP staffing cuts in FY97 and beyond. To assist them in managing these reductions, we designed the algorithm to compute staff distributions at varying levels of staff reductions, for example, a 10 percent cut, a 20 percent cut, and a 40 percent cut. As with the basic algorithm, reallocations can be calculated at the individual installation level of detail or at the MAJCOM aggregate level.

A briefing on the construction of the algorithm and the data it generated was delivered to the Air Force in September 1996 for their use in ongoing management deliberations. The algorithm and its data were also provided to MAJCOM transition program managers in October 1996.

Program Effectiveness and Performance Metrics

Early in this study, we discovered that all four military services lacked program performance metrics. The absence of these metrics severely restricts the ability to measure the effectiveness, cost, consistency, and quality of the services being delivered. While there is some statistical data and much anecdotal information available, there is no standard mechanism or criteria in use for determining the usefulness or quality of program services. It also appears that standardized feedback will be required for all military services by FY98 to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.

We conducted an informal prototype test of a survey of 240 TAP customers (15 per base at 16 bases), in which they were asked to rank the usefulness of 17 TAP services. This prototype survey used a rating scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being most useful. While this prototype needs considerable refinement, the results demonstrated that participants were able to discriminate in their scoring and among the services being measured. Individual base averages ranged from scores of 6.8 to 9.6, showing a greater variation in customer feedback than expected. The range of scores for TAP services was 7.4 to 9.4, with the TAP seminar receiving the highest score.

USE OF TECHNOLOGY

The Army is making effective use of existing and emerging technology in the ACAP. This section discusses two areas in which technology has practical application for Air Force delivery of transition services.

Management Information System

As discussed in Chapter 4, the operational transition program data available to managers at headquarters levels is limited and sometimes inconsistent. In addition, its collection and submission places a considerable workload on base transition program staffs because it is largely a manual process (although some bases have developed local spreadsheets). In Chapter 4, we also discussed some of the possible applications that TAP managers at headquarters levels could make of the data we collected on a one-time basis during this study. Of greater utility would be institutionalization of this type of program evaluation using data collected through automated processes and electronic reporting. In addition to one time "snapshot" applications, costs can be compiled over time for longitudinal comparisons at the individual installation, MAJCOM, or Air Force-wide level.

To facilitate the kind of data gathering and manipulation that we envision, the Air Force needs to develop a formal (standardized), computer-based MIS to support the TAP, and perhaps other FSC programs. Such a system should be designed to have, as a minimum, the following capabilities or features:

- ◆ Input, retrieval, integration, and extraction of data from various sources to provide timely information for TAP managers at base, MAJCOM, and Headquarters, Air Force levels
- ◆ Interface with existing military and civilian personnel data systems
- ◆ Client registration and tracking, scheduling of counseling and training, and database management and
- ◆ Reports generation capability to meet reporting requirements to MAJCOM, AFPC, and Air Staff.

Beyond these minimum capabilities, the potential exists to combine base-level cost-center data, workload data, and the data collected from a performance metric feedback system into an effective total program MIS. Using this type of information, program managers at MAJCOM or Air Force levels could review the operational efficiency of individual TAP offices. The amount of available staff time consumed in performance of administrative tasks in an individual TAP office can be compared to the Air Force average. If the individual office significantly exceeds the average, the MAJCOM staff may want to conduct a staff assistance visit to determine, for example, why administrative tasks are detracting from customer interface. Another effective use of this information would be to make the Air Force averages available to the MAJCOMs and individual TAP offices for their use as a benchmark in their own operational improvement processes. With the insight from such a system, TAP managers at the MAJCOM or Air Force level could

- ◆ reallocate staff resources,
- ◆ determine which sites need additional assistance, and/or
- ◆ allocate equipment and training dollars.

With this type of MIS in place, the Air Force would have the cornerstone of a continuous improvement process.

New Technology to Enhance TAP Efficiency

The Air Force started to investigate the use of new technology to enhance TAP efficiency. One example that appears to offer significant potential is PERMISS (Personnel Management Information and Support System), a knowledge-based system being used in Air Force civilian personnel management, which can be ex-

panded with expert systems (ES) modules. ES technology can potentially be used to increase the productivity of FSC staffs, specifically the counseling provided in the TAP. During the course of this study, TAP managers at Air Force Headquarters initiated discussions with the PERMISS program manager to explore the use of this technology.

Several potential benefits of ES, such as the following, are listed in *Decision Support and Expert Systems, Management Support Systems*:¹

- ◆ Increased output and productivity—ES can work faster than humans. . . . Increased output means fewer workers needed and reduced costs.
- ◆ Increased quality—ES can increase quality by providing consistent advice and reducing error rates. . . .
- ◆ Capture of scarce expertise—The scarcity of expertise becomes evident in situations where there are not enough experts for a task . . . or expertise is required over a broad geographic location. . . .
- ◆ Flexibility—ES can offer flexibility in both services and in manufacturing industries. . . .
- ◆ Accessibility to knowledge and help desks—Expert systems make knowledge (and information) accessible. . . .

Another example of the application of new technology is the Army's "TAP-in-a-Box"—an integrated, interactive multimedia application designed to provide service members with automated tools for the transition to civilian life. This system is being field tested by the Air Force at several small and remote locations. These new technologies offer the potential for relatively significant productivity enhancements, especially in the area of TAP counseling, at fairly modest costs.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS IN THIS CHAPTER

The key findings in this chapter are as follows:

- ◆ Overall, TAP staffing is lean. In FY95, over 90 percent of the bases had two or fewer TAP positions authorized.
- ◆ A base-level comparison of FTEs and demographics shows that there are significant imbalances between the authorized work force and the workload drivers: military population and separations.

¹ Efraim Turban, *Decision Support and Expert Systems, Management Support Systems*, 1993, p. 484.

Additional Management Issues Related to the Transition Assistance Program

- ◆ All the services lack a method to measure program performance, substantially restricting their ability to measure the effectiveness, cost, consistency, and quality of services.
- ◆ The Air Force TAP does not take full advantage of existing or developing information management technologies.

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

This final chapter outlines the primary conclusions we reached and provides recommendations resulting from our study of the Air Force's management and delivery of transition services.

CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions are summarized in the following subsections in broad categories. Assignment to a category is based on the predominant characteristics and major impact of the conclusion on a particular category.

Delivery of Transition Assistance Services Complies with Policy

The Air Force complies with the legal requirements for delivery of transition services within Air Force FSCs. Collocation, integration with other family service programs, and collaboration of staff members optimize program visibility and delivery of customer service. The current delivery model is the most appropriate and beneficial one for the Air Force.

Current program philosophy is in keeping with all other Air Force QoL programs. Adoption of the Army ACAP transition assistance model would require the Air Force to adopt a different philosophy, narrow program focus, and probably increase costs.

Organization and Staffing Should Not Change

Integration of the transition program into the FSC structure provides "one-stop shopping" convenience and reduces overlap of program responsibilities. Data submitted by the FSCs indicate that the synergism of the team approach has the effect of supplementing transition funding and staff years.

Allocation of TAP positions has resulted in apparent imbalances at certain locations between the TAP staff years and TAP workload. Realignment of staffing can result in improved delivery of services and better resource utilization within base FSCs.

Air Force adoption of the CORM/OMB model to deliver transition services would amount to no more than swapping the current civilian work force on a one-for-one basis for a contract work force, without a clear indication of any improvement or savings.

Contracting TAP service delivery does not appear to be a viable option because it would require using base-level resources to negotiate and administer 91 different contracts under current Air Force contracting practices.

Program Efficiency and Effectiveness

There was no indication that contracting TAP services would result in significant savings.

Compared to the alternative models we examined, the Air Force's current transition assistance organizational and staffing approach is cost-effective and best serves the Air Force family community.

The Air Force does not have an automated MIS or use sufficient automation to support the TAP and other FSC program management needs. Some bases use time-consuming and very inefficient manual accounting techniques to compile data for required quarterly reports. Differences in reporting definitions result in inaccurate and inconsistent program data. The lack of database capability does not enable the Air Force to support standard management analysis of the TAP and other FSC programs.

None of the services, including the Air Force, have developed reliable performance metrics to measure the value of the services being provided or the levels of customer satisfaction with TAP services. Today, there is insufficient scientific data to support restructuring or realigning resources or to support TAP continuation arguments during a period of resource constraints.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend the Air Force pursue the following strategies in enhancing its delivery of transition assistance services:

- ◆ *Continue using the current method of delivering TAP by primarily using a government work force.* The current organization works well and is cost-effective. There is no indication that delivery of transition assistance through contractor personnel would be better and, in fact, it appears to be more costly. In addition, conversion of this program may adversely affect the current synergism enjoyed by FSCs today and may have a negative impact on delivery of services other than transitions.

- ◆ *Realign the TAP staff to balance it with workload and program requirements.* Workload analysis suggests some TAPs are overstaffed while others are understaffed. To ensure uniformly good services, it is essential that the Air Force match personnel resources to requirements. Algorithms have been provided to the Air Force to assist in realignment decisions. Information provided can support decisions to change staff allocations to meet today's needs and support development of new staffing plans in response to future budget reductions.
- ◆ *Develop program performance metrics and a standardized means of capturing customer satisfaction and program utility.* We believe the Air Force, in conjunction with the other services and OSD, should develop a standard set of performance metrics to measure the value or usefulness of all TAP services and customer satisfaction with the services provided. This information will be useful in redesigning service delivery to better serve customer requirements.
- ◆ *Increase use of automation and technology to improve program delivery, management, and evaluation.* There are three areas in which the Air Force needs to improve: It needs to develop a standard MIS to capture necessary program information; use automated data collection rather than manual reporting; and use emerging technology such as expert systems or integrated, interactive, multimedia programs (e.g., the Army's "TAP-in-a-Box"). Better utilization of automated technology can free valuable and scarce human resources to benefit U.S. Air Force FSC customers.

Appendix A

Departments of Defense, Labor, and Veterans' Affairs Memorandum of Understanding

Transition Assistance Program (TAP) workshops are conducted through a partnership between the Departments of Defense (DoD), Labor (DoL), and Veterans Affairs (DVA). The responsibilities of these federal agencies are specified in a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the appropriate secretary in each department.

The MOU spells out detailed responsibilities for each of the three departments and their joint responsibilities at the national, state, and local levels. Program delivery leadership is concentrated within DoL, while DoD is responsible for service members' participation and logistical support. VA is responsible for providing veterans' benefits information and for program delivery of the Disabled Transition Assistance Program.

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS**

**TRANSITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WORKSHOP
AND
DISABLED TRANSITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Purpose: This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) implements Section 1144 of Title 10, U.S. Code. It supersedes and cancels the original MOU, dated January 2, 1991.

Public Law (P.L.) 101-510, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, November 5, 1990, authorized comprehensive transition assistance benefits and services for Service members who are separating from active duty and their spouses. An integral part of this legislation was the required establishment and maintenance of a Transition Assistance Program Workshop by the Department of Labor (DoL) in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The Act required that these Departments enter into a detailed agreement to implement this program.

This MOU, accordingly, recommits DoL, DoD, and VA to maintain a Transition Assistance Program (TAP) Workshop for members of the Armed Forces who are within 180 days of separation from active duty and their spouses, as required by Section 1144 of Title 10, U.S. Code. As a matter of policy, former Service members may attend the TAP Workshop on a space-available basis.

Background: Ever since Section 408 of P.L. 101-237, the Veteran's Benefits Amendments of 1989 (codified at Section 4100, Note, of Title 38, U.S. Code), authorized a pilot TAP Workshop, DoL, DoD, and VA have conducted Workshops at most major military installations in the United States. The 3-day Workshops provide employment information and vocational guidance to allow separating Service members to make informed career choices. Further, the Workshops provide Service members an array of job placement and employment/training services to carry out those choices and begin the transition to civilian employment prior to separation. Veterans' benefits information is also provided as part of the Workshop.

The TAP Workshop also includes the Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) as a component. Offered at major military installations throughout the United States, DTAP is specifically designed to provide disabled veterans' benefits information and employment assistance counseling for Service members being separated for medical reasons.

Definitions:

- **Coordinator.** A person at the local level from DoL, DoD, and VA who is responsible for TAP Workshop delivery.

- **Instructor.** A person trained at the National Veterans Training Institute (NVTI) or other entity approved by the National Office of Veterans Employment and Training Service whose primary duty is presenting instruction and providing administrative support of the TAP Workshop.

- **Major Military Installation.** A base or post under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense with 500 or more active-duty Service members assigned.

- **Point of Contact (POC).** A representative at the national level from DoL, DoD, and VA who is charged with carrying out that agency's responsibilities.

- **Separating Service member.** A uniformed member of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force who is being discharged, released from active duty, released from custody and control of the Armed Forces, transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve, or retired.

Objectives: The successful readjustment of veterans into civilian life is a mutual responsibility and concern of the DoL, DoD, and VA. To this end, these Departments are committed to active cooperation and coordination in maintaining a program to furnish counseling, assistance in identifying employment and training opportunities, help in obtaining such employment and training, awareness of veterans' benefits programs, and other related information and services to separating Service members and their spouses. The specific objectives of the DoL TAP Workshop are to:

- Prevent and reduce long-term unemployment problems among veterans;
- Enhance reserve component placement;
- Improve active component retention;
- Improve the perceptions of separating Service members;
- Reduce unemployment compensation paid to veterans.

Scope: The three-day DoL TAP Workshop will contain, at a minimum, the following topics:

- Personal appraisal, employment objectives, and goal setting;
- Making career and life decisions;
- Labor market information;
- Initiating a job search;
- Cover letters, resumes, and job applications;

- Dressing for the job search and interview techniques;
- Veteran's benefits;
- Disabled Veteran's benefits;
- Employment assistance for disabled veterans.

Responsibilities: This MOU concentrates program delivery leadership within DoL. The DoD is responsible for Service members' participation and logistical support. The VA is responsible for providing Veterans' benefits information and for DTAP program delivery. To facilitate a comprehensive program, DoL, DoD, and VA agree to the following.

- **Joint responsibilities:**
 - Share information about military personnel reductions and base closures/realignments as early as possible in order to project those sites where the number of TAP Workshops need to be expanded or reduced and resources readjusted as necessary;
 - Work together at the national and local level to avoid duplication of programs and continue to promote an effective sequence of transition services to affected Service members and their spouses;
 - Work together at the national and local level to promote Workshop sizes of no less than 15 and no more than 50 participants. This should include coordination between military installations, regardless of Military Service affiliation, within a region (defined as those within 100 miles of each other) to consolidate course delivery within regions to meet optimum TAP Workshop size;
 - Work together at the local level to ensure Service members and their spouses who are closest to their date of separation from active duty, personnel returning from overseas, or those assigned to remote or isolated sites, are given first priority in attending Workshops;
 - Continually refine the established training curriculum for instructors and course materials;
 - Consult on national directives issued to local and State offices, facilities, and installations representing the DoL, DoD, and VA in the conduct of the TAP Workshop;
 - Coordinate the support services required of and available through other public agencies, military and veterans' service organizations, and the private sector;

• Each quarter, review and assess the overall quality of the program and the specific quality and effectiveness of local delivery at participating sites, and work to modify the TAP Workshop as required.

• **The Department of Labor will:**

- Comply with all provisions of Sections 1144 (b) and (d) of Title 10, U.S. Code;
- Provide a POC and coordinators;
- Make available TAP Workshops, to the maximum extent feasible, on or within 100 miles of all major military installations within the United States;
- Be responsible for providing sufficient numbers of highly qualified Workshop instructors (state Local Veterans Employment Representatives, Disabled Veterans Outreach Program Specialists, DoL-approved contractor personnel, Veteran Service Organization service officers, for example) (pursuant to Section 1144 (d)(1) of Title 10, U.S. Code) to promote Workshop sizes of no fewer than 15 and no more than 50 participants, instruction aides (instructor's manuals, slides, overheads, etc.), and course materials for each participant at major military installations where the TAP Workshop is conducted;
- Provide training for instructors at the National Veterans Training Institute;
- Provide training at the National Veterans Training Institute, on a reimbursable basis, to DoD overseas personnel instructing programs similar to the DoL TAP Workshop;
- Monitor TAP Workshop delivery to maintain a high quality program. This should include surveys of participants in order to obtain their feedback, which will be used at the local level to improve the program and elevate to the national level problems of a national scope;
- Perform oversight of state Employment Service Activities and DoL contractors to ensure proper performance of TAP Workshop instructor functions;
- Perform, at DoD's request, site visits using checklists in the TAP Operations Manual, and give advice to DoD instructor personnel teaching TAP-like Workshops overseas;

• **The Department of Defense will:**

- Provide a POC and coordinators;
- Make available a DoD version of the TAP Workshop, to the maximum extent feasible, to all separating Service members who are assigned overseas at major military installations.

Departments of Defense, Labor, and Veterans' Affairs Memorandum of Understanding

- Provide suitable classroom facilities for seating normally no more than 50 participants on a regularly scheduled basis. Such facilities must include utilities (adequate lighting, ventilation, heat, etc.), male and female restrooms, furniture (tables, chairs, lectern, etc.), handicapped access, and sufficient parking. Audio visual equipment (projection screen, overhead projector, microphone, etc.), telephone, and janitorial services will also be provided.

- Work with DoL coordinators and other military installation coordinators within a region (defined as those within 100 miles of each other) regardless of Military Service affiliation, to promote course delivery within regions to meet optimum TAP Workshop size;

- Provide ongoing publicity such as, but not limited to, installation newspaper articles, flyers and posters;

- Encourage and promote maximum participation pursuant to Section 1144 of Title 10, U.S. Code;

- Notify and register participants. Work with DoL coordinators to give seating priority to Service members and their spouses who are closest to their date of separation from active duty, personnel returning to the United States from overseas, or those assigned to remote or isolated sites;

- Be a guest speaker source;

- Work with DoL to have the National Veterans Training Institute train, on a reimbursable basis, overseas DoD personnel teaching workshops similar to the TAP Workshop;

- Assist DoL and VA with monitoring TAP Workshop delivery via the DoD TAP quarterly report (RCS: DD-P&R(Q)1927);

- Follow-up with unit supervisory personnel to help ensure scheduled Service members are available for class, supervise facilities, and maintain classroom discipline;

- **The Department of Veterans Affairs will:**

- Provide a POC and coordinators;

- Be responsible for providing highly qualified benefits counselors, instruction aides (instructor's manuals, slides, overheads, etc.), and course materials for each participant at locations where the program is conducted;

- Provide VA training curriculum and support to the National Veteran Training Institute and DoL TAP staff regarding Veteran's benefit information and claims assistance;

- Monitor VA TAP and DTAP delivery to maintain a high quality program. This should include surveys of participants in order to obtain their feedback, and which will be used at

the local level to improve the program and elevate to the national level problems of a national scope;

- Provide guidance on the role of all veterans' service organizations;

Oversight: The DoD, DoL, and VA POCs at the national level will meet quarterly or as required to discuss program accomplishments and plans and/or to resolve conflicts. The DoL representative will chair the meetings.

Review/Changes: The DoD, DoL, and VA POCs at the national level will periodically review this MOU as necessary, but not later than 60 days prior to the anniversary date. Changes to this MOU shall be in writing and approved by the signatories or their successors.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

BY: Preston M. Taylor Jr.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR VETERAN'S
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BY: A. Paug
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FORCE
MANAGEMENT POLICY

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

BY: [Signature]
UNDER SECRETARY FOR BENEFITS

DEC 28 1994

Appendix B

Transition Activities Visited

During the course of this study, we conducted over 100 interviews with program managers at all organizational levels in DoD. We also conducted interviews with two private-sector corporations involved in transition assistance. This appendix lists the locations visited and the organizations and activities at which the interviews were conducted in Table B-1.

Table B-1. Transition Activities Visited

Organization	Office or activity
Office of the Secretary of Defense	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel Support, Families, and Education) Transition Support and Services Directorate
DoD Activities	Defense Civilian Personnel Center
Army	Total Army Transition Division Headquarters, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command Fort Myer ACAP, Virginia Fort Eustis ACAP, Virginia Fort Lee ACAP, Virginia Fort Meade ACAP, Maryland Fort Sam Houston ACAP, Texas Fort Wainwright ACAP, Alaska Schofield Barracks ACAP, Hawaii Yongsong Garrison ACAP, Korea
Navy	Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS-662D), Navy Annex, Virginia United States Naval Academy Family Services Center, Annapolis, Maryland Naval FSC, Oceana, Virginia Naval FSC, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Fort Meade Navy TAMP, Maryland
Marine Corps	Office of the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Navy Annex, Virginia
Air Force	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Force Management and Personnel), Pentagon, Virginia Directorate of Civilian Personnel and Personnel Plans, Pentagon, Virginia Human Resources Development Division, Directorate of Civilian Personnel Policy and Personnel Plans, Pentagon, Virginia Transition Operations, Directorate of Personnel Programs Management, Air Force Personnel Center, Texas Family Plans and Policy Office, Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia Family Plans and Policy Office, Headquarters, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado

Table B-1. Transition Activities Visited (Continued)

Organization	Office or activity
Air Force (continued)	Bolling AFB FSC, Virginia Eielson AFB FSC, Alaska Fort Meade Air Force TAP, Maryland Hickam AFB FSC, Hawaii Langley AFB FSC, Virginia Osan AFB FSC, Korea Peterson AFB FSC, Colorado Springs, Colorado Yokota AFB FSC, Japan
Other federal agencies	DoL, Washington, D.C. DVA, Washington, D.C. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley Facility, Virginia
Private sector	Resource Consultants, Inc. (RCI), Vienna, Virginia Zeiders Enterprises Incorporated, Woodbridge, Virginia


Note: ACAP = Army Career and Alumni Program; TAMP = Transitional Assistance for Military Personnel; AFB = Air Force Base; FSC = Family Support Center.

Appendix C

Detailed Description of TAP Functions


Delivery of transition assistance services in the Air Force involves several Family Support Center (FSC) programs besides the TAP itself such as relocation assistance, financial counseling, and spouse employment. The TAP is also linked to other base organizational elements such as the education, library, military and civilian personnel flights, medical facility, housing, and transportation offices. TAP delivery also involves the Department of Labor (DoL); the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA); and other state, regional, and local government agencies. The detailed diagram (Figure C-1) contained in this appendix shows these organizational relationships and illustrates how the various players interact.

Figure C-1. Air Force Transition Assistance Program (TAM/TAS) Functions and Their Interrelationships



Note: Acronyms are defined in Appendix E.

Air Force Transition Program
and Their Interrelationships with Resource Providers)



Appendix D

Collection and Processing of TAP Data

INTRODUCTION

We researched the data needed to support our study and whether they were available in sufficient detail for analysis. To compare current TAP service delivery with alternative models, we needed to identify and isolate the various cost elements of transition expenditures (i.e., labor, nonlabor, training, supplies, and equipment) and to analyze TAP costs and manpower utilization by function, MAJCOM, base, and customer. This appendix outlines how these data were collected and processed for analyses.

REVIEW OF EXISTING DATA

The primary source of available TAP data is the *FY95 Quarterly TAP Reports*, (RCS: DD-P&R[Q] 1927), at Headquarters, USAF. A summary of the data in this report for 1995 is shown in Table D-1. While these data may be useful for a program overview and to provide some insight into staff workloads and the use of TAP services, they proved inadequate for in-depth analyses. Additionally, our research revealed some inconsistencies in the quarterly report data from base to base. For example, some bases counted only the number of *customers* who used TAP services during the quarter, no matter how many office visits they made. Other bases counted the number of customer *visits*, including repeat visits by the same customers. Another major shortcoming was the lack of cost center accountability required for our study. Such data are essential for conducting cost comparisons among bases, MAJCOMS, and other models.

For these reasons, we decided to design data-collection spreadsheets and construct a new database for use in this study.

DESIGN AND USE OF ELECTRONIC SPREADSHEETS

On the basis of the need to collect large amounts of data rapidly from Air Force bases worldwide, we designed and used electronic spreadsheets to facilitate easier data capture, faster data transmission to and from TAP sites, and better data management and computation capability. This method of data collection enabled quicker analysis of the data. Samples of the four worksheet tables we used are depicted in Figures D-1 through D-4. Data were collected for FY95, since that period reflected the most recently completed fiscal year at the time of data capture. Each table is discussed separately below.

Table D-1. Annual Summary of Quarterly TAP Data for FY95

TAP service, task, or activity	Number of customers			
	USAF	Rate ^a	Spouses	Other
Pre-separation counseling (all customers)	52,190	82.0%	2,344	1,058
Other transition counseling:				
♦ Effects of career change	11,426	22.0%	—	—
♦ Employment assistance	11,278	77.0%	6,015	—
♦ Relocation assistance	20,720	40.0%	1,489	—
♦ Education and training assistance	25,601	49.0%	—	—
♦ Financial planning	745	1.4%	—	—
♦ Guard/reserve affiliation	8,581	16.0%	—	—
♦ Disabled veteran information	20,702	40.0%	—	—
Other transition services				
Employment assistance visits ^b	168,264	NA	19,686	—
Individual transition plan	17,863	34.0%	—	—
Job fairs held	147	—	—	—
Participating employers	6,258	—	—	—
Estimated attendees	96,602	—	—	—
TAP workshops conducted	1,206	—	—	—
♦ attendees	34,257	—	—	—
Military separations/retirements	63,750	—	—	—

^a The participation rate for pre-separation counseling is determined by dividing the number of participants by the number of FY95 separations and retirements. All other participation rates are determined by dividing the number of participants by the number who received pre-separation counseling.

^b This is the reported number of *visits* by customers using employment assistance on multiple occasions.

Since we had already observed the interrelationship of the various FSC functions in delivering all FSC services, we wanted to account for the use of FSC staff resources by position and program. The first worksheet (Figure D-1) captures the percentage of time each FSC staff member (shown on the left vertical axis) spends annually performing the major FSC programs and functions (shown horizontally across the top of the form).¹ Each staff member's time must total 100 percent. The first three columns on the left provide data fields for position grade (military or civilian); full-time equivalent (FTE) staff years to account for part-time employees or job-sharing by two people; and approved overtime. The position (staff) titles are standardized to facilitate Air Force-wide analysis.

¹ Acronym and program definitions are found at Appendix E.

Figure D-3. FSC Nonlabor Costs for FY95

Table #3: FSC Non-Labor Costs for FY95				
Category	Costs			Comments
	Transition Specific	Non-Transition Costs	Total FSC Costs	
Supplies				
Equipment				
Staff Training				
Staff Travel				
Printing/Publications				
Contracts for other than personnel				
Total				
2S O&M (Non-Civ. Pay) No personnel costs included				
INSTRUCTIONS: (1) In all entries above, please enter all nonpersonnel services costs, e.g., a job fair facility, printing contract, etc. (2) In all entries above, please exclude all costs reported in Table #1. (3) 2S O&M (Non-Civ. Pay) is not expected to equal to Total Transition Specific Costs.				

Figure D-4. Basic Demographic Data for FY95

Base Name:				
FSC POC Name:		FSC POC Phone:		LMI POC:
Table #4: Basic Demographic Data for FY95				
	Military Members	Civilian Work Force	Spouses	Comments
Assigned Base Population			N/A	
Number of USAF Separations plus Retirements			N/A	
Number of Transition Customer Contacts: U.S. Air Force Service Members				
Number of Transition Customer Contacts: Other Service Members				
INSTRUCTIONS: (1) Assigned base population and number of separations + retirements should be obtained from the official records kept by the local MPF and CPF. Example: 60 separations + 40 retirements = 100 individual personnel. (2) Number of transition customer contacts is the same number as reported on AF Form 2806 (Family Support Center Statistical Summary)				

The data in Figure D-4 help put all the other information on costs and workload in proper perspective. It includes separate data fields for military members, civilians, and spouses.

WORLDWIDE DATA COLLECTION

After we validated the effectiveness of worksheet design and clarity of instructions through a pilot test in Air Combat Command (ACC), we distributed the spreadsheets electronically Air Force-wide. At LMI's request, each FSC director designated a project officer responsible for the data capture. Individual FSCs were given about 12 workdays to complete and return the worksheets to LMI. We worked directly with the FSC project officers, who were instrumental in achieving a quick turnaround with a high rate of return. Completed spreadsheets were received from 84 of the 91 TAP sites operating in FY95, for a 92 percent return rate.

Table D-2 illustrates a typical base input of the data received from each of 84 sites. It shows the percentage of time spent annually on FSC programs, which is an estimate by each FSC staff showing how its time was spent, by program and position, for FY95.

Table D-2. An Illustration of How a Typical FSC Staff Spends its Time

Percentage of Time Spent Annually on FSC Programs (Base A)																	
Functions Staff Title	Grade (Civ, Mil)	FTE years	TAP	RAP	Career Focus Program	PFMP	Air Force Aid	VRP	Family Life Educa- tion	Readi- ness Ser- vices	I&R	Policy, Planning & Coordi- nation	Leader- ship Con- sulta- tion	Crisis Assis- tance	Out- reach	Other	Total
FSC Director	GS-12	1	4	3	5	1	5	2	15	8	4	20	15	2	6	10	100
Deputy Director	E-7	1	4	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	4	20	15	1	15	22	100
TAM	GS-11	1	69	1	13	1	1	1	1	1	3	4	2	1	2		100
TAS	GS-09	1	52	8	25	2	1	1	1		5	2	1	1	1		100
RAM	GS-11	1	2	33	2	2	2	30	2	1	7	6	6	2	4	1	100
RAS	GS-09	1	5	30		40			10	5	5	5					100
Career Focus Mgr		0															
PFMP Mgr	GS-09	1	2	2	3	36	32	2	1	1	3	5	5	4	2	2	100
AFAS Mgr		0															
Family Life Ed Mgr	GS-09	1	5						50	10	12	8	2	5	8		100
VRP Mgr		0															
I&R Mgr	GS-07	1	5	4	16	4	5	1	3	1	54	1	1		5		100
Readiness Mgr		0															
Information Mgr		0															
Secretary/Admin	GS-04	1	15	35	10	2	1	1	1	1	31					3	100
Fam Svc Contract	8700	0.63		32				22			6	3					63
VA Work Study		1.59	105	6	40						8						159
Relo Assist Tech	GS-07	1	3	68	1	1		1	1	1	10	3	3	1	4	3	100
Total FTE's		13.22	2.71	2.26	1.19	0.93	0.51	0.62	0.86	0.30	1.52	0.77	0.50	0.17	0.47	0.41	13
FTE Percent			20.5%	17.1%	9.0%	7.0%	3.9%	4.7%	6.5%	2.3%	11.5%	5.8%	3.8%	1.3%	3.6%	3.1%	100%


Note: The overtime column was removed from this worksheet since it was not used at this base.

The data in Table D-2 clearly illustrate the integration of the FSC work force, including the TAP staff. Note that all assigned FSC staff members spend a portion of their time on other programs outside their primary areas of responsibility. Part of this work force integration is necessitated by the fact that some of the standard FSC staff positions, such as Career Focus and Air Force Aid in this case, are not filled. Position vacancies, whether temporary or permanent, may vary from base

to base. However, the lack of assigned staff at any given location does not relieve that FSC of responsibility for providing service to its customers for all required programs. Hence, the transition and other FSC staff spend some of their time delivering service to Career Focus, Air Force Aid, and other programs.

The data shown in Table D-2 were not useful in their original form for Air Force-wide analysis. The raw data from each of 84 bases showing the percentage of time the FSC staff spent on each program could not simply be added together to create an Air Force total. First, it was necessary to convert the time percentages for each base to a standardized FTE database in order to provide a common unit (FTEs) for Air Force-wide analysis by staff position, FSC program, base, MAJCOM, and other workload or work force characteristics. The process of standardizing the FTE data is illustrated in Figure D-5.

Figure D-5. Process for Standardization of FTE Data



Note: The worksheets in this figure are notional representations used for illustration purposes.

The end result of the standardization process is shown in Table D-3, which reflects the total annual (FY95) FSC FTEs (staff years) from 84 bases located worldwide.

Table D-3. Total Annual FSC FTEs

Total Annual FTE's Spent on FSC Programs at 84 Bases—FY95															
Functions Staff Title	Transition Assistance Program	Relocation Assistance Program	Career Focus Program	Personal Financial Mgt Program	Air Force Aid Society	Volunteer Resource Program	Family Life Education	Readiness Services	Information & Referral	Policy, Planning & Coordina- tion	Leadership Consulta- tion	Crisis Assistance	Outreach	Other	Total
FSC Director	6.14	5.64	3.49	3.70	4.12	3.39	3.82	6.41	4.62	16.12	13.70	3.32	5.03	3.50	83.0
Deputy Director	5.17	4.06	3.00	4.65	9.59	2.58	2.39	5.83	5.77	11.37	9.07	2.08	3.56	11.88	81.0
TAM	64.96	1.44	5.21	0.30	0.63	0.37	0.40	0.41	2.36	3.30	2.22	0.47	1.85	1.12	85.0
TAS	70.28	1.38	3.97	0.84	0.81	0.30	0.23	0.45	2.69	1.70	0.63	0.41	1.94	1.40	87.0
RAM	3.16	56.96	0.88	0.44	1.42	2.80	0.77	1.82	4.18	3.84	2.33	0.44	2.20	1.80	83.0
RAS	2.80	55.17	1.62	1.52	0.80	2.05	0.81	2.14	4.62	1.68	0.88	0.41	2.56	0.95	78.0
Career Focus	7.50	1.17	42.34	0.48	1.44	5.36	0.57	0.55	1.55	1.36	0.54	0.31	1.79	1.05	66.0
PFMP	2.30	1.48	1.24	51.14	10.59	0.39	0.44	0.50	2.46	1.42	1.63	0.94	1.74	0.74	77.0
AFAS	1.12	0.71	0.39	5.08	35.48	0.97	0.43	0.70	2.71	0.72	0.76	1.97	1.09	0.87	53.0
Family Life	1.54	1.06	1.16	1.09	1.29	1.30	28.35	7.65	4.72	2.28	1.24	3.26	2.52	0.54	58.0
VRP	0.72	1.05	1.01	0.31	0.68	20.92	0.61	0.88	2.71	1.18	1.04	0.17	0.89	0.44	32.6
I&R	1.83	1.73	1.50	1.22	1.83	1.89	2.87	2.51	29.52	1.31	1.12	1.82	2.48	3.39	55.0
Readiness	0.37	0.40	0.32	0.37	0.20	0.34	2.42	4.31	1.28	0.84	0.47	0.61	0.69	0.38	13.0
Information Mgr	1.48	1.39	0.81	0.64	0.79	0.57	0.64	1.04	7.54	0.81	0.43	0.44	0.43	4.99	22.0
Secretary	4.87	4.50	2.79	2.74	3.02	2.23	1.93	2.12	19.40	0.41	0.14	0.23	0.31	19.31	64.0
Fam Svc Contract	9.11	7.90	1.57	1.87	0.33	1.59	1.39	0.19	1.70	0.70	0.36	0.17	0.60	2.73	30.2
VA Work Study	32.30	4.90	2.15	0.89	0.24	0.46	1.32	0.11	4.36	0.05	0.02	0.40	0.66	1.41	49.3
Other	1.26	5.75	0.20	0.04	0.02	1.41	0.66	0.41	1.03	0.69	0.33	0.19	0.39	1.62	14.0
Total FTE's per year	216.90	156.66	73.64	77.31	73.27	48.91	50.05	38.01	103.21	49.76	36.90	17.63	30.72	58.12	1031.1
Average Percent	21.04%	15.19%	7.14%	7.50%	7.11%	4.74%	4.85%	3.69%	10.01%	4.83%	3.58%	1.71%	2.98%	5.64%	100%

Table D-3 provides a statistical matrix of the level of effort expended by program and staff position at 84 FSCs Air Force-wide in FY95, measured on a FTE basis.² Overall, it shows an FSC staff equivalent of 1,031 FTE positions, or an average of 12 positions per FSC. The “Total” column on the right reflects the number of FTEs for each position listed on the left (83 FSC director FTEs and 85 TAM FTEs). The fractions (e.g., VRP, Family Services Contract, and VA Work Study) result from positions with part-time staff members.

Looking across the columns from left to right, we see how many FTEs are devoted to each FSC program or service by staff position. Note that 216.9 FTEs were expended in FY95 on the TAP Air Force-wide (not counting seven nonreporting bases). This makes TAP the *single* largest consumer of overall staff effort in the FSC, with just over 21 percent of the total FTEs.

Without exception, Table D-3 shows that from an Air Force-wide perspective, every staff position contributes a portion of its time to every FSC program. The best illustration of this staff and program integration is the TAP. Note that the

² In this situation, the terms “authorized and assigned,” have no common meaning because the FSC staff is a mixed work force of civil service (GS) employees, military personnel, contractors, “VA work studies,” overhires, and volunteers—some working fulltime, others parttime. As noted in Chapter 3, one FTE is equivalent to 2,080 staff hours. For nontechnical accounting, an FTE can be thought of as one staff year (40-hour work week × 52 work weeks). It provides a standard unit for measuring the level of staff effort in a mixed work force such as in the FSC.

TAP staff (TAM and TAS) contributed 172 FTEs of the 1,031 FSC FTEs—about 17 percent of the total. Almost 80 percent of that contribution (135.24 FTEs) was in the TAP, with the remaining 36.77 FTEs spread across all other FSC programs. Conversely, the FSC staff contributed 81.7 FTEs, or 38 percent, of the 216.9 total FTEs dedicated to the TAP.

The difference between what TAP contributed to the FSC (36.77 FTEs) and what it received from other FSC staff (81.66 FTEs) is a significant synergistic result (44.89 FTEs). When this difference is distributed across the 84 reporting bases, it represents a net gain to the TAP of just over one-half FTE per base. Other FSC programs and services enjoying similar synergistic gains are Career Focus, Volunteer Resource, Readiness, and Information and Referral. A further breakout of the total annual TAP FTEs by transition function for the 84 reporting bases in FY95 is shown in Table D-4.

Table D-4. Total Annual TAP FTEs

Total FTE's Used Annually on Transition Tasks—FY95													
Functions ----- Staff Title	Establish Goals, Objectives and Procedures	Develop Annual Transition Budget	Maintain Resource Center/ Help Customers Use It	Market Transition Program	Review/ Analyze Labor Market Trends	Evaluate TAP Effectiveness & Submit Reports	Plan & Conduct Job/Career Fairs	Manage & Administer Personnel Resources	Conduct Pre- separation Counseling (DD Form 2648)	Conduct Follow-up Counseling	Coordinate, Plan & Facilitate TAP Seminar	Establish & Maintain TACC	Total
FSC Director	1.32	0.91	0.12	0.82	0.12	0.90	0.17	1.30	0.08	0.04	0.18	0.20	6.14
Deputy Director	0.41	1.68	0.86	0.60	0.04	0.51	0.07	0.82	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.02	5.17
TAM	4.27	2.09	7.99	4.38	1.70	5.51	2.57	2.84	19.69	6.33	6.03	1.57	64.96
TAS	2.05	0.57	14.82	3.50	1.49	3.07	2.61	0.43	18.61	8.72	14.11	0.31	70.28
RAM	0.03	0.00	1.09	0.86	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.43	0.40	0.26	3.16
RAS	0.02	0.00	0.90	0.75	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.54	0.39	0.14	2.80
Career Focus	0.04	0.00	2.52	0.58	0.45	0.02	1.81	0.20	0.31	0.73	0.85	0.00	7.50
PFMP	0.04	0.00	0.54	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.37	0.71	0.01	2.30
AFAS	0.02	0.00	0.28	0.34	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.27	0.05	0.00	1.12
Family Life	0.05	0.01	0.36	0.31	0.05	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.10	0.15	0.35	0.04	1.54
VRP	0.02	0.00	0.28	0.23	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.72
I&R	0.03	0.03	0.36	1.08	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.01	1.83
Readiness	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.37
Information Mgr	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.47	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.22	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.00	1.48
Secretary	0.01	0.02	2.63	1.18	0.01	0.20	0.03	0.45	0.08	0.00	0.23	0.03	4.87
Fam Svc Contract	0.02	0.00	3.96	0.44	0.03	0.02	0.18	0.00	1.09	2.28	1.08	0.01	9.11
VA Work Study	0.77	0.00	20.71	2.09	1.14	0.29	2.25	0.46	1.20	1.13	2.25	0.01	32.30
Other	0.06	0.01	0.22	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.10	0.36	0.00	1.06
Other2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20
Total FTE's per year	9.18	5.33	58.26	18.18	5.25	10.63	10.11	7.17	41.68	21.16	27.34	2.60	216.90
Average Total Percent	4.2%	2.5%	26.9%	8.4%	2.4%	4.9%	4.7%	3.3%	19.2%	9.8%	12.6%	1.2%	100%

The data in Table D-4 were derived from our spreadsheet on the percentage of time spent annually on transition tasks (Figure D-2). Data were collected, processed, and standardized in exactly the same manner as described in Figure D-5 for FSC data. Any FSC staff members who marked any portion of their time under the TAP were required to show how that time was spent by task (Figure D-2). After collecting the raw TAP data from 84 bases showing the percentage of time spent on each of 12 TAP tasks, we followed the same standardization process shown in Figure D-5 to convert the percentages to FTEs. The end result is shown

in Table D-5, which reflects the total annual FTEs by transition function or task at 84 bases in FY95.

Table D-5. TAP and FSC Nonlabor Costs for FY95

Total FSC Nonlabor Costs for 84 Bases				
Category	FY95 Costs			Comments
	Transition Specific	Non-Transition	Total FSC	
Supplies	\$494,642	\$869,860	\$1,364,502	General office supplies; computer software
Equipment	\$1,352,378	\$1,010,550	\$2,362,929	Computers, furniture, audio visual equipment
Staff Training	\$111,871	\$208,174	\$320,045	FAMNET II, Career Focus, Financial training
Staff Travel	\$175,412	\$546,780	\$722,192	NVTI, Job Fairs, Veteran's Conference, Community Services
Printing/Publications	\$231,655	\$377,979	\$609,634	TAP Books, subscriptions, videos, training materials, copier service
Non-Personnel Contracts	\$102,802	\$428,008	\$530,810	Equipment repair, facility rental for seminars and training classrooms
Other	\$28,700	\$33,800	\$62,500	Furniture, equipment repair, resume writing class
Total	\$2,497,460	\$3,475,152	\$5,972,612	
2-S O&M (Non-Civ. Pay)	\$2,344,631	Amount reported by 84 bases as their nonlabor budget for TAP in FY95.		

Note that the 216.9 FTEs shown in the “Transition Assistance Program” column in Table D-4 are now reflected in the total column of Table D-4. Of the total FTEs expended on transition, just over 62 percent (135.24) were contributed by the TAP staff, with the balance (81.66) coming from all other FSC staff members. About 15 percent of the total was provided by VA work studies. One notable highlight illustrated by the TAP data is that only four tasks account for almost 70 percent of the total annual FTEs in this program—*pre-separation counseling, follow-on counseling, resource center operations, and the TAP seminar*. Overall, these data show that about 84 percent of TAP FTEs are related to functions involving customer interface or services, with the other 16 percent devoted to program management.

While the first part of our data collection focuses on the distribution and use of labor resources, we also prepared a spreadsheet (Figure D-3) with a list of standardized categories for the bases to report nonlabor costs. Since those costs were reported directly in dollars, we entered those data into our database without having to make further adjustments or conversions. Table D-5 shows the total Air Force-wide nonlabor costs for the TAP and the rest of the FSC reported by 84 bases for FY95. Examples of items included in each nonlabor category are listed in the “Comments” column but the list is not all-inclusive. The data in this table show that almost \$2.5 million (41.8 percent) of the total FSC nonlabor expenditures in FY95 were for the TAP.

Across the bottom of the table, we show the amount of “2S (transition-specific) operations and maintenance (O&M)” funds that were budgeted for noncivilian pay (nonlabor) in FY95 as reported by the 84 bases. We compared the amount of actual nonlabor costs reported in support of the TAP to the budgeted amount. According to the data collected for these 84 bases, 6 percent (\$152,829) of nonlabor costs in support of the TAP were paid by base O&M accounts. Just over half the TAP nonlabor costs were for equipment, primarily computers. As we will discuss later, nonlabor costs account for about 23 percent of total TAP costs.

In the final phase of our data collection, we asked each FSC to report certain demographic data (base population, number of separations and retirements, and the number of TAP customer contacts) relating to the customer base to whom TAP services were provided. The primary purpose of these data are to provide some context or perspective by which to view each base’s cost and workload data. The basic demographic data provided by 84 bases for FY95 are shown in Table D-6. It indicates military members comprised about 95 percent of the FY95 customer base, while spouses and civilians made up 4 percent and 1 percent, respectively.

Table D-6. Basic Demographic Data (Totals for 84 Bases) for FY95

Category	Military	Civilians	Spouses	Total
Assigned Base Population	387,457	158,029	N/A	545,486
Air Force Separations and Retirements	60,310 ^a	9,753	N/A	70,063
Transition Customer Contacts (Air Force)	373,022	5,396	13,637	392,055
Transition Customer Contacts (Other Services)	12,800	445	1,167	14,412

^a This is the unaudited number of separations and retirements reported by 84 bases for FY95. The audited number of Air Force-wide losses in FY95 is 63,750.

CONVERTING FTE DATA TO COST DATA

So far, our discussion of FSC and TAP data has focused primarily on two things: the annual percentage of time spent by FSC staff members on various programs and the resulting annual FTEs by program and position. In order to determine TAP labor costs by discrete function, which can be analyzed and compared to other models, the FTE data must now be converted to cost data, since costs are not recorded in accounting systems to the level of detail desired.

The first step is to review what data was collected. Table D-7 provides a notional view of those data for selected positions and programs at a sample base. It shows

grade and other information for FSC staff positions, including the annual percentage of time each staff member spent on FSC programs and TAP.

Table D-7. Annual Percentage of Time Spent on Selected FSC Programs

Functions ----- Staff Title	Grade (Civ, Mil)	FTE years	Transition Assistance Program	Relocation Assistance Program	Career Focus Program	Personal Financial Mgt Program	Air Force Aid Society	Other	Total
FSC Director	GS-12	1	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.82	100
Deputy Director	E-7	1	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.80	100
TAM	GS-11	1	0.69	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.01	0.15	100
TAS	GS-09	1	0.52	0.08	0.25	0.02	0.01	0.12	100
RAM	GS-11	1	0.02	0.33	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.59	100
RAS	GS-09	1	0.05	0.30		0.40		0.25	100
Career Focus		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
PFMP	GS-09	1	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.36	0.32	0.25	100
Other		6.2	1.33	1.45	0.67	0.07	0.06	2.64	
Total FTE's		13.2	2.71	2.26	1.19	0.93	0.51	5.62	13.2

Note: Several FSC programs and positions have been consolidated in a column or row marked "Other."

In the next step, we computed a cost for each staff member, program, and function in order to support an Air Force-wide evaluation of resource utilization. Using the grade levels reported by 84 of 91 FSCs and data from the 1996 federal civilian and military pay tables, we determined a notional cost for each staff position by assigning a mid-range salary for each grade level and multiplying that amount by a benefits factor to arrive at a fully burdened labor cost for each position.³ Table D-8 illustrates the notional staff labor cost determinations for selected positions at a typical base.

Table D-8. Staff Labor Cost Determinations for Selected Positions

Functions/ Staff Title	Mil./Civ. grade	FTE years	Mid-range grade salary	Benefits factor	Total^a (\$)
FSC Director	GS-12	1	\$47,518	0.258	59,774
TAM	GS-11	1	\$39,645	0.258	49,870
Career Focus Mgr.	GS-9	1	\$32,768	0.258	41,219
PFMP Mgr.	GS-7	1	\$26,786	0.258	33,695
VA Work Study	VA	0.25	NA	NA	NA

^a Totals may not add due to rounding.

³ The benefits factor we used (0.258) was developed by LMI to reflect approximate costs for all benefits.

We then multiplied the totals shown in Table D-8 by the appropriate time percentages illustrated in Table D-7 to provide a staff labor cost by position and program at each of the 84 reporting bases. Table D-9 is a notional representation of the results of this calculation for selected FSC positions and programs at a typical base.

Table D-9. Annual Staffing Costs for Selected FSC Programs and Positions

Functions ----- Staff Title	Grade (Civ, Mil)	FTE years	Transition Assistance Program	Relocation Assistance Program	Career Focus Program	Personal Financial Mgt Program	Air Force Aid Society	Other	Total
FSC Director	GS-12	1	\$2,391	\$1,793	\$2,989	\$598	\$2,989	\$49,014	\$59,774
Deputy Director	E-7	1	\$2,009	\$2,009	\$2,009	\$2,009	\$2,009	\$40,186	\$50,232
TAM	GS-11	1	\$34,410	\$499	\$6,483	\$499	\$499	\$7,481	\$49,870
TAS	GS-09	1	\$21,434	\$3,298	\$10,305	\$824	\$412	\$4,946	\$41,219
RAM	GS-11	1	\$997	\$16,457	\$997	\$997	\$997	\$29,423	\$49,870
RAS	GS-09	1	\$2,061	\$12,366	\$0	\$16,488	\$0	\$10,305	\$41,219
Career Focus			\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PFMP	GS-09	1	\$824	\$824	\$1,237	\$14,839	\$13,190	\$10,305	\$41,219
Other			\$8,837	\$37,190	\$8,160	\$2,171	\$1,928	\$91,991	\$150,276
Total			\$72,964	\$74,436	\$32,180	\$38,425	\$22,024	\$243,651	\$483,680

Note: Several FSC programs and positions have been consolidated in a column or row marked "Other."

These are computed costs not the actual (exact) costs, because they do not take into account employees who may be at the bottom or at the top of the salary scale, actual locality pay rates, or other allowances such as overseas cost-of-living allowances. However, we believe the methodology used ensures representative cost data and provides a reliable tool for analyses.

The same process described above was used to compute TAP labor costs by function or task. As shown in Table D-7, the data we collected provided the annual percentage of time each FSC staff member spent on the TAP. Anyone who reported spending time on the TAP was asked to further distribute that time by the percentage spent on each transition *task*. A notional view of that data for selected positions and tasks at a typical base is shown in Table D-10.

Next, we multiplied the percentages by the staff costs shown in the TAP column of Table D-9 to provide a staff labor cost by position and by transition task for each of the 84 bases. Table D-11 is a notional representation of the results of this calculation for selected positions and tasks at a sample base.

The final step in the process of converting FTEs into Air Force-wide cost data is to sum the results shown in Tables D-9 (FSC) and D-11 (TAP) for all 84 reporting

bases. Table D-12 provides the actual cumulative results of using this process to compute total FSC costs by staff position and program for the 84 reporting bases. This table shows that Air Force-wide FSC labor costs for these 84 bases were just over \$42.5 million in FY95, and that over one-third of these total costs were related to only two programs—transition and relocation.

Table D-10. Annual Percentage of Time Spent on Selected TAP Tasks

Functions ----- Staff Title	Operate Resource Center	Market Transition Program	Conduct Pre- separation Counseling	Conduct Follow-up Counseling	Facilitate TAP Seminar	Other	Total
FSC Director						0.04	0.04
Deputy Director	0.01	0.01				0.02	0.04
TAM	0.12	0.03	0.2	0.08	0.03	0.23	0.69
TAS	0.1	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.1	0.13	0.52
RAM	0.01			0.01			0.02
RAS		0.05					0.05
PFMP Mgr				0.01	0.01		0.02
Other	1	0.21	0.0	0.11	0.0	0.01	1.33
Total FTEs	1.25	0.32	0.35	0.24	0.14	0.43	2.71

Note: Several FSC programs and positions have been consolidated in a column or row marked "Other."

Table D-11. Notional Annual Staffing Costs for Selected TAP Tasks

Functions ----- Staff Title	Operate Resource Center	Market Transition Program	Conduct Pre- separation Counseling	Conduct Follow-up Counseling	Facilitate TAP Seminar	Other	Total
FSC Director	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,391	\$2,391
Deputy Director	\$502	\$502	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1,005	\$2,009
TAM	\$5,984	\$1,496	\$9,974	\$3,990	\$1,496	\$11,470	\$34,410
TAS	\$4,122	\$824	\$6,183	\$1,237	\$4,122	\$16,417	\$21,434
RAM	\$499	\$0	\$0	\$499	\$0	\$0	\$997
RAS	\$0	\$2,061	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,061
PFMP Mgr			\$0	\$412	\$412	\$0	\$824
Other	\$2,713	\$6,124	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$8,837	\$8,837
Total	\$13,820	\$11,008	\$16,157	\$6,137	\$6,030	\$40,120	\$72,964

Note: Several FSC programs and positions have been consolidated in a column or row marked "Other."

No costs are shown for the VA work study position in Table D-12 because none of those costs are paid from Air Force funds. This is a veteran's training position, paid entirely from VA resources. All other costs are computed from the FTE data discussed earlier. On average, the cost of labor at each of the 84 reporting bases is about \$505,000 per FSC. Almost half of the FSC labor costs (49 percent) are consumed by four programs—transition, relocation, career focus, and personal financial management—with collective labor costs of \$20.99 million.

Table D-12. Air Force-Wide FSC Costs (84 Bases)

Total Annual Labor Costs for FSC Programs—FY95 (\$)															
Functions Staff Title	Transition Assistance Program	Relocation Assistance Program	Career Focus Program	Personal Financial Mgt Program	Air Force Aid Society	Volunteer Resource Program	Family Life Education	Readiness Services	Information & Referral	Policy, Planning & Coordination	Leadership Consultation	Crisis Assistance	Outreach	Other	Total
FSC Director	382,503	347,333	218,489	229,110	253,880	207,868	233,028	388,346	282,705	1,005,204	851,421	204,832	302,866	213,895	5,121,482
Deputy Director	265,335	207,844	151,437	235,025	489,594	132,936	123,583	305,894	298,226	603,255	488,431	109,708	185,941	613,823	4,211,032
TAM	3,295,169	71,564	259,823	14,961	31,169	18,452	19,948	20,197	117,444	164,322	110,462	23,190	92,260	55,855	4,294,816
TAS	2,924,579	56,677	159,879	34,418	33,012	12,160	9,480	17,966	109,545	69,114	25,592	16,900	79,063	57,481	3,605,867
RAM	157,086	2,814,401	43,540	21,943	69,951	138,262	38,400	90,514	207,467	190,685	115,765	21,694	109,378	87,527	4,106,613
RAS	112,465	2,210,993	60,078	62,277	32,675	82,468	33,388	88,151	185,177	74,263	38,752	16,694	103,394	37,804	3,138,578
Career Focus	360,265	57,845	1,991,173	23,582	67,848	253,503	28,148	27,102	74,125	64,167	26,730	14,658	88,166	46,558	3,123,871
PFMP	90,091	60,745	51,454	2,005,016	423,811	15,326	17,320	20,405	95,623	54,045	65,200	38,442	70,871	30,032	3,038,382
AFAS	41,447	27,372	15,693	197,257	1,328,666	35,903	16,023	27,669	98,605	25,091	26,737	77,181	43,970	30,404	1,992,018
Family Life	64,311	46,980	46,464	48,043	56,633	57,305	1,245,994	340,066	207,528	107,562	57,860	152,252	112,320	24,335	2,567,653
VRP	26,998	41,420	35,283	11,273	27,087	800,367	25,022	36,778	102,235	45,676	43,853	6,898	33,497	17,557	1,253,943
I&R	65,351	63,437	53,577	44,372	66,690	71,896	114,721	98,966	1,117,301	50,106	41,856	70,756	91,702	134,511	2,085,242
Readiness	15,947	17,746	14,535	16,929	9,392	15,345	102,583	180,419	55,121	38,600	21,856	28,349	29,473	16,585	562,880
Information Mgr	46,478	42,736	28,750	20,828	25,269	18,314	21,012	32,114	226,237	26,396	13,377	14,884	16,009	154,105	686,508
Secretary	119,313	119,126	74,045	71,868	76,761	58,081	49,430	56,341	495,879	10,674	3,635	5,939	7,913	515,376	1,664,382
Fam Svc Contract	147,131	121,664	23,618	22,831	5,291	22,166	14,488	2,785	22,816	9,090	4,853	3,035	6,875	31,920	438,564
VA Work Study	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	39,927	231,069	8,108	1,747	911	102,896	27,942	15,040	40,913	27,462	13,240	10,278	16,957	73,260	609,749
Total	8,154,396	6,538,952	3,235,948	3,061,481	2,998,638	2,043,250	2,120,511	1,748,754	3,736,946	2,565,714	1,949,620	815,688	1,390,655	2,141,028	42,501,580
Percent	19%	15%	8%	7%	7%	5%	5%	4%	9%	6%	5%	2%	3%	5%	100%

As expected, the staff position that bears the highest labor costs is the FSC director, at 12 percent of the total. The program with the highest labor costs is the TAP, at just over 19 percent of the total. As shown earlier with FTE data in Table D-4, TAP receives more dollar resources from the FSC than it contributes to the FSC. The difference is just over \$253,000 Air Force-wide. Nevertheless, the TAP staff (TAM and TAS) remains the highest contributor to overall FSC labor costs, with about 18.6 percent of the total.

Again, we must point out that these are computed costs and will not reconcile with actual (exact) Air Force-wide FSC labor costs for FY95 for the reasons discussed earlier. Also, the data only cover 84 of the 91 FSCs operating in FY95. However, we believe this table fairly represents a reliable snapshot of total staff labor costs for FSC programs by staff position at the 84 reporting bases. Our intent was to produce ratios for analyses, not to reconcile costs to accounting records.

While the Transition Assistance Program column in Table D-12 shows overall TAP labor costs related to staff *positions*, Table D-13 provides a further breakout of those costs by position and specific *task* at 84 bases Air Force-wide in FY95.

Table D-13. Air Force-Wide TAP Costs (84 Bases)

Total Annual Labor Costs for Transition Tasks—FY95 (\$)													
Functions Staff Title	Establish Goals, Objectives & Procedures	Develop Annual Transition Budget	Maintain Resource Center/ Help customers use it	Market Transition Program	Review/ Analyze Labor Market Trends	Evaluate TAP Effectiveness & Submit Reports	Plan & Conduct Job/ Career Fairs	Manage & Administer Personnel Resources	Conduct Pre- separation Counseling on Form 2648	Conduct Follow-up Counseling	Coordinate, Plan & Facilitate TAP Seminar	Establish & Maintain TACC	Total
FSC Director	81,976	54,145	6,969	52,803	7,424	54,473	10,299	82,682	5,694	2,391	11,545	12,104	382,503
Deputy Director	20,323	86,108	43,478	33,944	2,415	25,956	3,375	40,918	2,846	949	4,020	1,005	265,335
TAM	215,439	107,221	398,462	222,421	84,156	281,268	131,782	144,125	1,002,639	325,403	303,709	78,545	3,295,169
TAS	81,461	23,846	614,539	143,476	61,639	123,145	109,735	17,649	789,264	372,951	576,116	10,758	2,924,579
RAM	1,496	0	54,730	42,140	997	0	1,995	499	911	21,444	20,599	12,274	157,086
RAS	824	0	36,801	28,954	824	412	1,161	0	412	22,108	16,365	4,602	112,465
Career Focus	1,908	0	118,685	28,025	22,008	911	86,457	9,541	14,615	35,506	42,608	0	360,265
PFMP	1,649	0	21,529	16,967	0	0	1,237	2,024	3,635	14,921	27,718	412	90,091
AFAS	839	0	9,052	12,281	337	0	412	1,685	3,348	11,660	1,832	0	41,447
Family Life	2,407	499	13,329	13,601	2,147	0	5,618	0	3,961	5,816	15,283	1,649	64,311
VRP	824	0	10,162	7,811	1,986	997	824	499	0	0	3,894	0	26,998
I&R	1,043	1,086	13,401	36,379	824	1,096	749	3,900	2,398	581	3,482	412	65,351
Readiness	1,001	502	3,429	3,317	911	0	4,621	0	1,005	251	911	0	15,947
Information Mgr	0	0	17,738	16,408	272	0	698	5,350	1,685	1,685	2,643	0	46,478
Secretary	243	486	61,879	29,560	272	5,354	707	11,851	2,176	0	5,968	816	119,313
Fam Svc Contract	225	0	62,651	6,255	751	379	2,776	0	15,584	37,089	21,292	129	147,131
VA Work Study	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,934	337	6,314	674	1,685	1,846	674	7,931	3,369	3,369	11,793	0	39,927
Total	413,593	274,230	1,493,147	695,017	188,648	495,837	363,121	328,654	1,853,541	856,122	1,069,780	122,706	8,154,396
Percent	5%	3%	18%	9%	2%	6%	4%	4%	23%	10%	13%	2%	100%

Here we see that Air Force-wide TAP labor costs for these 84 bases were almost \$8.2 million, with 76.3 percent of those costs borne by the TAP staff (TAM and TAS). Of the total labor funds expended by TAP in FY95, about 80 percent were used in customer service or interface (e.g., counseling, TAP seminar, resource center, and job fairs) while the remaining 20 percent were related to program management (e.g., reports, budget, and goals). The average TAP labor costs at each of these 84 bases is around \$97,000 per site. Outside the TAM and TAS positions, more TAP labor dollars were used for FSC directors (5 percent) than any other position. But, as seen with FTEs, every FSC position made a contribution to TAP.

An Air Force-wide summary of FTE and cost data compiled from the 84 reporting bases is presented in Figure D-6. This table summarizes the annual FSC and TAP FTE data shown earlier in Tables D-3 and D-4, as well as the annual cost of FSC and TAP labor resources found in Tables D-12 and D-13.

Figure D-6. Air Force-Wide Summary of FTE and Cost Data (84 Bases)

Total FSC and TAP Labor Costs—84 Bases			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	\$6,219,748	\$1,680,935	\$7,900,683
FSC (non-TAP)	\$1,934,648	\$32,666,249	\$34,600,897
Total	\$8,154,396	\$34,347,184	\$42,501,580

Average FSC and TAP Labor Costs			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	\$74,045	\$20,011	\$94,056
FSC (non-TAP)	\$23,032	\$388,884	\$411,915
Total	\$97,076	\$408,895	\$505,971

FSC and TAP Labor Costs as Percent of Total FSC Costs			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	14.6%	4.0%	18.6%
FSC (non-TAP)	4.6%	76.9%	81.4%
Total	19.2%	80.8%	100.0%

Total FSC and TAP FTEs—84 Bases			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	135.24	36.77	172.00
FSC (non-TAP)	81.66	777.42	859.08
Total	216.90	814.18	1031.08

Average FSC and TAP FTEs			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	1.61	0.44	2.05
FSC (non-TAP)	0.97	9.25	10.23
Total	2.58	9.69	12.27

FSC and TAP FTEs as Percent of Total FSC FTEs			
To From	TAP	FSC (non-TAP)	Total
TAP	13.1%	3.6%	16.7%
FSC (non-TAP)	7.9%	75.4%	83.3%
Total	21.0%	79.0%	100.0%

By combining the costs of TAP labor from Table D-13, with the nonlabor costs from Table D-5, we computed the total costs for operating TAP at 84 bases in FY95. Next, we divided this “bottom-up” calculation by the number of separations and retirements in FY95 at the 84 reporting bases to determine the per capita costs of providing transition services for each separatee in FY95. These calculations are as follows:

- ◆ Tap labor costs + TAP nonlabor costs = total TAP costs:

$$\$8,154,396 + \$2,497,460 = \$10,651,856.$$

- ◆ Total TAP costs ÷ FY95 separations = per capita TAP costs:

$$\$10,651,856 \div 60,310 = \$177.$$

We validated this “bottom-up” calculation by comparing it to the total TAP funding allocated by the Air Force Family Matters Office for all 91 operational sites, plus 8 MAJCOM headquarters. The “top-down” calculation is

- ◆ TAP labor + nonlabor allocation = total FY95 TAP allocation:

$$\$9.1 \text{ million} + \$2.8 \text{ million} = \$11.9 \text{ million.}$$

-
- ◆ Total TAP allocation ÷ total separations = FY95 per capita allocation:

$\text{\$11.9 million} \div 63,750 = \text{\$187 per separatee.}$

On the basis of these determinations, we believe the computed “bottom-up” per capita cost (\$177) compares favorably to the furnished “top-down” number (\$187), especially since the latter includes the costs associated with all 91 TAP sites and the staffing and equipping of 8 MAJCOM headquarters TAP offices.

Appendix E

Glossary

AARP	American Association of Retired Persons
ACAP	Army Career and Alumni Program
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACS	Army Community Service
AEAN	Army Employer and Alumni Network
AFAS	Air Force Aid Society
AFB	Air Force Base
AF/DPCH	Air Force Human Resources Development Division
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFPC	Air Force Personnel Center
ARNG	Army National Guard
CA	Commercial Activity
CAP	Career Awareness Program
CARIT	Career Information Teams (Navy)
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
CNA	The Center for Naval Analysis
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONUS	Continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
COTT	Carry on Target Team
CPF	Civilian Personnel Flight
DD	Defense Department
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoL	Department of Labor

DORS	Defense Outplacement and Referral Service (formerly called JOBS)
DRU	direct reporting unit
DTAP	Disabled Transition Assistance Program
DVA	Department of Veterans' Affairs
DVOP	Disabled Veterans Outreach Program
ES	Expert Systems
FAIB	Family Action Information Board
FAMNET	FSC On-line Network
FMP	Force Management Policy
FORMIS	Forces Management Information System
FSC	Family Support Center
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Plan
GS	General Schedule
HMO	Health Maintenance Organization
HQ	Headquarters
I&R	Information and Referral
ITP	Individual Transition Plan
JAC	Job Assistance Center (Army)
JOBS	Job Opportunity Bank System
JTPA	Job Training Placement Act
LMI	Logistics Management Institute
LVER	Local Veterans' Employment Representative
MAJCOMS	Major Air Commands
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MEO	Most Efficient Organization
MIS	Management Information Systems
MJAT	Mobile Job Assistance Teams (Navy)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPC	Military Personnel Command

MPF	Military Personnel Flight
NCOA	Noncommissioned Officers Association
NFSC	Navy Family Service Center
NVTI	National Veterans Training Institute
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPNAYINST	Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACS	Public and Community Service
PERMISS	Personnel Management Information System
PERSCOM	U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
PFMP	Personal Financial Management Program
POC	Point of Contact
PPO	Preferred Provider Option
QOL	Quality of Life
QTAP	Quality Transition Assistance Program
RAM	Relocation Assistance Manager
RAP	Relocation Assistance Program
RAS	Relocation Assistance Specialist
RCI	Resource Consultants Inc.
SSB	Special Separation Benefit
TACC	Transition Assistance Coordinating Committee
TAMP	Transition Assistance Management Program (Navy)
TAMP	Transition Assistance for Military Personnel (USAF)
TAO	Transition Assistance Office (Army)
TAP	Transition Assistance Program (or Plan)
TAS	Transition Assistance Specialist
TBB	Transition Bulletin Board
TERA	Temporary Early Retirement Authority
TMO	Transportation Management Office
TROA	The Retired Officer Association

TSM	Transition Service Manager
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USMC	United States Marine Corps
VA	See DVA
VETS	Veterans Employment and Training Service
VMET	Verification of Military Experience and Training
VRP	Volunteer Resource Program
VSI	Voluntary Separation Incentive

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